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Abstract: This paper presents new evidence for major world regions and for the most
populous countries in each region on associations between the average ages of populations
and three groups of economic outcomes: (1) macroeconomic aggregates (domestic saving as
a share of GDP, GDP per capita, capital per worker and tax revenue as a share of GDP); (2)
governmental expenditures on education and health; and (3) social indicators (inequality,
unemployment, homicide rates, and schooling progression rates). The results suggest that the
variables considered follow clear age-related patterns, that the patterns differ by regions, and
that the patterns differ with different policy regimes related to trade openness, domestic
financial market deepening and macroeconomic volatility. The evidence is consistent with
the possibility that some age structure shifts can provide favorable conditions for
development. Apparently regions such as East Asia in recent decades have been able to
benefit from this demographic opportunity. However, in others such as Latin America and
the Caribbean -which is at the verge of experiencing the largest age structure shifts in the
coming decades- creating an adequate economic environment to translate the opportunity
into higher living standards for its population is a major challenge.
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Introduction
The emphasis on demographic factors in economic development has varied considerably
over time. In some eras demographic factors have been viewed by many as strongly shaping
development prospects, often with dire concerns about overpopulation in a Mathusian tradition.
At other times -- including most of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s -- demographic factors
have been considered by economists as one of many aspects of the development process, in part
responding endogenously to that process, but without any particular centrality.  More recently,
there has been a revival of emphasis on demographic factors as importantly shaping development
options with this revisionist emphasis being on implications of the changing age structure in the
latter part of the demographic transition.
Before the onset of the stereotypic demographic transition, crude birth rates and death
rates are both relatively high and young and old dependency ratios are stable. In the first phase of
the transition mortality falls, particularly infant and child mortality, as a result of improvements
in clean water, nutrition, and sanitation methods, so that the young dependency ratio increases. In
the second phase of the transition, fertility typically falls after infant mortality has declined,
perhaps because couples can achieve a desired family size with lower fertility. With a lag the
young dependency ratio falls due to the lowered fertility rates.  With a much greater lag (perhaps
after fertility and mortality rates have stabilized in the third stage), as the population bulge due to
the first phase of the transition ages and becomes old, the old dependency ratio increases.  In the
third phase of the transition fertility rates and mortality rates are moderate.  So, the demographic
transition leads to changes in the age structure of the population that may be rapid if the
demographic transition is rapid.
A central question in this new perspective has been whether there is a “window of
demographic opportunity” through which East and Southeast Asian have passed and Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) is passing because of transitory low dependency ratios (due to
falling youth dependency ratios with lesser fertility and more slowly increasing old dependency
ratios and associated life cycle patterns in savings, human resource investments, health demands,
work patterns, etc.).    ADB (1997, p. 158), for example, claims that Asia’s recent “demographic
gift” has accounted for 0.5 to 1.3 percentage points of the annual GDP per capita growth rate, or
from 15 to 40 percent of the average annual growth rate of 3.3 percent between 1965 and 1990.4
Because of this and other studies, increasingly conventional wisdom has become that the age
structure changes that occur as part of the demographic transition may affect substantially
economic options in the medium run. The empirical explorations related to such possibilities to
date, however, have been limited and have not considered many of the channels through which
these effects might be manifested.
This paper presents some new empirical evidence on associations between age structures
of populations, as summarized by their average ages, and selected economic outcomes. We start
in Section 1 by briefly documenting differences in age structures across major regions in the
world and selected countries including the most populous ones for each region. In Section 2 we
present our strategy for estimating the age pattern of a series of variables and discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of using the country average age as a summary indicator of age
structure. Section 3 presents the country average age patterns, net of country fixed effects and
year fixed effects, for four aggregate macroeconomic variables (domestic saving, GDP per
capita, capital per worker and tax revenue), three variables related to the provision of public
education and health, and four socioeconomic indicators (the Gini coefficient, unemployment
rates, homicide rates and schooling progression rates). Section 4 explores if the country average
age patterns differ between low and high levels of trade openness, financial market deepening
and macroeconomic stability. Section 5 concludes.
1. Age Structures in Major World Regions and Subregions in 1995 and 2020
Table 1 presents data on the population age structures in major world regions and
subregions in 1995 and on those estimated for 2020 using the moderate UN (1998) population
projections and definitions of regions and subregions. The population shares for three age groups
are given:  “young” (0-14 years old), “working age” (15-64 years old), and “old” (65 and older).
1
All six African subregions are in the initial stage of the demographic transition, with
large proportions of the population in the young age group (42% in 1995) due to recent high
fertility rates. The relative size of the working age population is lower than in any other region in
                                                       
1 For convenience as a shorthand terminology we use “young,”, “working-age” and “old” to refer to these three age
groups throughout this paper.  These designations are meant only to capture the age structures of populations, not
necessarily to describe behavioral choices (e.g., whether the majority of persons at various ages are working) or
health, both of which vary substantially across populations and over time in the same population.5
the world (54%), while the share of population in the old age group is negligible (3%).  The
average population age ranged from 21.0 to 24.2 years in 1995 (with Eastern Africa the lowest).
Central and South America and South-central, Southeastern and Western Asia also are relatively
young (with average ages in the 24.4 to 27.0 range), but are well into the second stage of the
transition. These subregions have on average around 35% of their population in the young age
group, around 61% in the working age group and not more than 5% in the old group. In contrast,
Eastern Asia and the countries in Europe and North America are well into the final stage of the
transition. Around 20% of their populations is in the young age group, two thirds of their
populations is of working age, and with the exception of Eastern Asia, more than 12% of their
populations is old.  The average ages in 1995 were 30.5 years for Eastern Asia, 35.2 for Northern
American, and between 35.8 and 38.3 years for the European subregions (with Western Europe
the highest).   Thus there is considerable current variation in age structures among regions and
subregions, with average ages by subregions in 1995 ranging from 21.0 in Eastern Africa to 38.3
years in Western Europe.  The regions/subregions that are relatively “younger” include all those
in Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean (LA), and Asia (excluding Eastern Asia).  Those in
Eastern Asia and Europe and North America are relatively “older.”
Due to the speed of the demographic transition in the developing world, there is a
tendency for the “younger” regions to catch up with the “older” ones. By the year 2020, the
proportions of populations in working age across all subregions (with the exceptions only of
Western, Eastern and Middle Africa) will be fairly similar – between 0.63 and 0.69 -- according
to the UN medium projections. The main difference among regions will be that the proportion of
the old will be much larger in the “older” countries (0.12 in Eastern Asia and from 0.16 to 0.21
in the subregions of Europe and North America but less than 0.10 in the “younger” subregions),
while the younger ones will still have substantial proportions of the young (from 0.24 to 0.41 in
Africa, Asia (excluding Eastern Asia), and LAC, but under 0.20 in the “older” subregions). The
young dependency ratios are projected to decline significantly between 1995 and 2020 in the
younger subregions, but only marginally in the older ones.  The old dependency ratios are
projected to increase quite dramatically in the older subregions, but only marginally in the
younger subregions.
The average ages across subregions are also slowly tending to convergence, though with
considerable lags for three of the African subregions. Between 1995 and 2020, the UN medium6
projections are that in LAC and Asia the average age will increase by 6.1 and 5.5 years, while it
will rise by 4.4 years in Europe and North America. The average in Africa is expected to
increase by only 3.3 years, reflecting that young dependency will still be very high in this region.
However for Western Sahara and Northern Africa, the projected increases in average ages are 5.5
and 5.6 years respectively, so the lag in convergence in Africa basically is for the other four
African subregions.
Table 1 shows that of all the regions that for 1995 we classify as “younger”, Central
America and South America are the ones that are predicted to experience the greatest changes in
age structure in the following 25 years.
2 Southeastern Asia will also experience a relatively fast
demographic transition, but it will be somewhat slower than the average in LAC.
2. Methodological Considerations
General Strategy:  In the following sections we explore the relations between changing age
structures and a series of aggregate variables across regions and over time. To look at the
relations between changing age structures and aggregate economic variables we draw on the
literature on the dynamic analysis of individual decision making using time series of cross-
sectional data. In this literature, the average behavior of cohorts of individuals are followed
through in the absence of data that tracks the same individual as he/she ages time (Browning,
Deaton and Irish 1985). In a similar fashion, we follow the average behavior of a set of variables
as countries go from a stage at which large proportions of their population are young to later
stages at which the relative shares of older groups increases. The main difference between our
approach and the micro life-cycle analysis is that when individuals are followed, there is a
natural and inevitable steady aging process. But an older country can become younger or age at a
reduced rate due to a surge in fertility. Therefore countries do not necessarily follow a natural
monotomic linear progression from young to old.  In fact in the initial stages of the demographic
transition the average age of a population tends to fall and only subsequently does it tend to rise.
                                                       
2  In Behrman, Duryea and Székely (1999) we take a closer look at the Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Specifically, we look at the demographic structure in each country, and  we also discuss in detail where each country
fits into the picture presented in the following sections of this paper.7
In the context of the literature on individual decision making, a change in any aggregate
variable can be traced back to three factors. First, individuals may behave differently at each
stage of their life cycles, and therefore a change in the age composition of the population shifts
the value of aggregate variables even though for any individual conditional on life-cycle stage or
age there is no change in behavior. Second, there can be factors that are common to all cohorts
and stages of the life cycle within a country, or country effects, such as a common culture.
Third, there can be factors that are common to all cohorts and stages of the life cycle across
countries at a point of time, such as a shock in international markets, or period (year) effects. Our
interest here is in the first of these three effects – i.e., how life cycle effects are revealed as the
population shares of different birth cohorts change due to the demographic transition.
Representation of Country Age Structures: There are many ways of summarizing
information on the age structure of a country.  We use the mean age. The mean has the
disadvantage of not summarizing all relevant information about the age structure of a country,
but it simplifies the interpretation of our results and conveys almost the same information as
would alternatives such as the tripartite division among young, working-age adults, and old.
3 The
mean age is in fact highly correlated with the population shares of these broad groups. The
correlation coefficients between the country average age and the share of the population in the 0-
14, 15-64, 65 and over groups, are -.97, .89, and .96, respectively, for 1950-1995.
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To give a better idea about the relation between mean country ages and the population
shares in the young, working-age and old age groups, we use panel data for the period 1950 to
1995 to estimate three regressions in which the dependent variables are the three population
shares for the young, working-age and old age groups, respectively, and the right-side variables
are average country ages, country fixed effects and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates
for the age dummies are shown in Figure 1. The figure therefore shows the typical distribution of
population in the three broad age groups corresponding to each country average age (while
abstracting from country and year fixed effects). A region which has an average age of about 27,
                                                       
3 Regressions using the shares of different population subgroups rather than country mean ages (not presented) are
not  significantly more consistent with variations in the dependent variables that are discussed in the next two
sections.
4 Correlations for finer disaggregations of the age groups to the age ranges 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49,
50-54, 55-60 and 60-64 are .36, .30, .41, .65, .81, .88, .91, .93, .94, .77, .6, .50, .51 and .54, respectively. Note that
the correlations between the average and the division of the population into young, working age and over 65 are
quite strong, but the correlations decline if the working age population is split in finer partitions. Therefore, our
results mainly capture shifts among the three broad age groups mentioned in the text.8
as for Asia and LAC in 1995, for example, has about 34% of its population in the young group,
62% in the working-age group, and 4% in the old group.  Africa is younger, with a larger share
of young and a smaller share of working-age population (and slightly smaller share of old).  The
four rapidly growing East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore –
indicated by “4 East Asia”) are much older, and the developed countries are older still, with
much smaller shares of young and larger shares of both working-age and old groups in their
populations.
To test whether these patterns differ by regions, we estimate the same relations separately
by regions. Figure 2 plots the coefficient estimates for the average age variables obtained with
the working-age population share as the dependent variable. This figure suggests that the average
East Asian country has a slightly larger proportion of its population in the working age at each
country average age than do LAC, Eastern Europe and developed countries. The largest
difference is observed at 30 years of age, where the average East Asian country typically has
69% of its population in the 15-64 group, while the average developed country has around 63%.
However, the only significant differences are those between the averages for developed and East
Asian countries for the average age range of 27 to 31, where the latter systematically has a
significantly larger proportion of population in working age, at the same average age. These
results and similar results for the young and old age groups suggest that the interpretation of
what average country age means in terms of the age structure of a population will be very similar
irrespectively of the region in which each country is located, with but a few exceptions.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the average country ages, by major regions. The
mean average age for the period 1950-1995 for all 164 countries included in the analysis is 25.2
years. The minimum is 19 years and the maximum is 39 years. There is a large difference
between developed and developing countries. For the former, there are no observations for the
country average age in the 19-25 year range while developing country average ages cover the
whole spectrum. Among the developing country regions, East Asia has the broadest range (from
21.5 to 39.2), followed by Eastern Europe (22-38), Asia (excluding East Asia, 20 to 34), the
Middle East (19-34) and LAC (20-34). Among the developing country regions, Africa has the
shortest coverage, from 19 to 29 years of age. Among all the regions, moreover, Africa has the
smallest standard deviation because most countries in this region have average country ages
close to the mean of 22 years.9
A possible concern is that because the panel that we are using is unbalanced, the patterns
that emerge from the data could be reflecting differences in composition of the sample across
different country average ages. Regression results might only be identified by developing
countries at younger ages and mainly by developed countries at old ages. Table 3 gives the
number of observations (that is, country-year observations) for every country average age, by
region. The first column shows that there are many more observations in the 21-25 year range
than in any other, and that the number declines considerably after age 25. All of the observations
up to age 24 are from developing countries. At the other extreme, there are relatively few
observations in the oldest country average age ranges. In this case, the sample of countries is
quite balanced in terms of developed and developing countries, but among the developing
countries there are no observations for Africa, LAC, Asia and the Middle East after age 36. For
the country average ages of 37, 38 and 39, the developing countries that identify regressions
based on the full sample are from East Asia and Eastern Europe.
While the unbalanced sample is not a cause of alarm per se, because the sample size is
lower at older ages, the degree of precision of the estimates for the 36-38 range will be lower
than for the rest of the country average ages. A smaller balanced panel (in terms of number of
observations) could be used instead of the full panel, but the loss of information would be
substantial.
Basic Specification for Estimates: The regressions in the next two sections that
characterize the relations between a number of aggregate variables and country age structures are
parallel to those used to obtain the estimates in Figures 1 and 2, using the same panel of
countries for the period 1950 to 1995 and including the same right-side variables: average age of
the population of each country in each time period, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects:
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(1)  Xi,t = aADi,t + byear,t + gcountryi + ei,t
                                                       
5 This procedure is similar to a smoothing technique used and discussed by Deaton and Paxson (1994), Attanasio
and Banks (1998), Attanasio (1998) and Jappelli (1999) on household survey data, in which a dependent variable is
regressed on a series of age and cohort dummies, while time effects are normalized and assumed to be zero. In our
case, we regress the dependent variable on country average age dummy variables and control for year and country
fixed effects (including time effects also helps to de-trend the dependent variables). For most of our dependent
variables, statistical tests indicate that the country fixed effects and year fixed effects are statistically significant.10
where X is a one of a set of aggregate variables for country ‘i’ and year ‘t’; AD is a vector of 19
dummy variables indicating the average age of the country in that particular year (the dummy for
average age 19 is always the excluded category), the variable year indicates the year of each
observation, the variable country indicates the country of each observation and e is the error
term. The coefficient estimates for the elements in the AD vector reveal whether, after
controlling for country fixed characteristics and time effects, the X variable shifts as the average
age of the country changes.
6  In most of the graphs shown in the following sections we plot the
coefficient estimates for the average country age dummy variables after controlling for country
and year fixed effects. We interpret the graphs to represent the pattern of an aggregate variable as
the average age of a country changes, net of country and year effects.  We also estimate two
alternative specifications with interactive differences by region or by decade to see whether there
are differences among regions or over time in the extent to which age structure changes are
associated with changes in the aggregate variables of interest.
3. Estimates of Associations between Country Average Ages and
Socioeconomic Outcomes
This section presents the country average age patterns for eleven different variables,
classified into three groups: (1) four macro variables: domestic saving, GDP per capita, capital
per worker and tax revenue; (2) three indicators of governmental expenditures on education and
health; and (3) four indicators of social conditions: the Gini index of inequality, unemployment
rates, homicides per 1000 individuals, and schooling progression rates.  The estimates are
summarized in figures that give the age coefficient estimates, net of country and year fixed
effects.  Each figure indicates along the horizontal axis the average ages in 1995 for the major
world regions and for the most populous country in each region, as well as for the countries with
the lowest and highest average ages in the world -- Uganda and Germany, respectively. The
                                                       
6 Miles (1999) presents a calibrated general equilibrium model that explicitly considers the connection between
demography and savings and then simulates the effect of future demographic changes on savings. Our approach is
similar in spirit to Miles’ in the sense that we try to identify the pattern that a variable follows as a country ages, but
there are two important differences. First, our intention is not to develop a full behavioral model as Miles does, but
rather to flesh out the association between X and the average country age. Second, we obtain our patterns from
historical data, while Miles’ main focus is to simulate the behavior of a specific variable in the future as a result of
expected demographic changes.11
average age for 1950, 1995 and that estimated for 2025, for all the countries for which
information is available, is presented in Appendix C.
7
3.1 Macro Savings/Capital/Tax/Product Variables
Domestic savings as a share of GNP: Simple versions of life-cycle savings theories predict that
individuals save little or dis-save at young ages when their income-generating capacities are
lower than their desired consumption, then the same individuals save at high rates when they are
in their prime working ages because their annual income flows exceed their average annual
permanent income, and then, when the same individuals reach old age and are no longer
generating as much income as when they were in their prime working ages, they use past savings
for maintaining consumption above their current income. We expect that aggregate domestic
savings follow a similar pattern. Countries with high young dependency ratios are expected to
have relatively low savings shares in GNP because large shares of their population have
relatively low productivities and are at a stage of the life cycle in which they are “investing” in
human capital for increasing future income-earning capacities. Countries that have reached a
stage of the demographic transition in which their working-age populations are relatively large
so that overall dependency ratios are low are expected to save relatively more in order to shift
resources for their anticipated desired consumption greater than current income when they
become older.  Countries with high old dependency ratios are expected to save relatively less
because the old are using resources accumulated in the past through individual savings, pension
schemes, or other social benefits to maintain their consumption above their current income
levels.
Figure 3 plots the coefficient estimates for the country average age dummies from
estimating equation (1) with domestic savings as a share of GNP as the dependent variable for
the whole sample (the solid line labeled “general pattern”). The figure shows the expected
inverted “U” shape for savings along the average-age pattern. As the country average ages
increase from the low 20s, the savings rate increases sharply and reaches a peak at around an
average of 33 years of age and declines somewhat for higher country average ages. The increase
                                                       
7  The appendices provide substantial related information underlying the figures presented in the text. Appendix A
gives the central underlying point estimates for these figures, with the basic estimates in Table A1, those with
regional interactions for LAC in Table A2 and for East Asia in Table A3, and those with decade interactions for12
in the value of the coefficient estimates between ages 20 and 33, the decline between the age 33
dummy and the dummy for ages 37 and 38 and the decline between ages 35 and 36 and 36 and
37 are all significant and are all consistent with the life-cycle savings theory.
8
Figure 3 also indicates on the horizontal axis regional average ages, the average ages in
the most populous country in each region, and the average ages for the two countries with the
lowest and highest average ages (Uganda and Germany, respectively), all for 1995. Countries
with young populations, such as Uganda, Nigeria, India and most other countries in the African
and South Asian regions, have mean ages associated with relatively low savings rates. LAC has
populations that are five years older on average than Africa, which implies a larger proportion of
the population in the prime-working ages and higher savings rates, as indicated for Brazil.  LAC
has a slightly older population on average than all of Asia, but a much younger population on
average than the four East Asian countries that have undergone the fastest recent demographic
transition. It is well known that the East Asian economies have much larger domestic savings
rates than the average Latin American and Caribbean country.  An important part of the
difference may be that the average individual in East Asia is at a later stage of his/her life cycle,
which is characterised by higher savings rates. Indeed at the averages for the two regions in the
figure the savings rate is twice as high for the average age of the four fast-growing East Asian
economies (about 28%) as for the average age for LAC (about 14%).  Developed countries such
as the United States and Germany are the oldest group.  They have somewhat less average
savings rates than the four fast-growing East Asian economies perhaps in part because their
country average ages are greater than the peak levels in the figure, presumably associated with
the increase in the relative weight of older population subgroups that are approaching or have
reached retirement ages.
However, the general pattern may be an oversimplification if the nature of the relation
varies by region. Figure 3 also plots the country average age dummies for four different groups
of countries.  Perhaps surprisingly, developing countries have a much more pronounced inverted
“U” country average age pattern (with a statistically significant decline after age 33
9) than does
                                                                                                                                                                                  
LAC in Table A4. Appendix B gives F tests for the significance of differences between coefficients, with one table
for each of the 11 dependent variables considered in this section..  Appendix D gives data sources.
8 In his simulations, Miles (1999) finds a similar pattern for the United Kingdom although the turning point occurs
in the future at around age 42.
9 The ‘p’ tests for the significance of the difference between all the coefficient estimates of each of the regions by
region is not presented here for brevity, but are available upon request.13
the whole sample. Thus the general pattern is not driven only by the experience of developed
countries, as might be expected given the slowdown and decline in savings that occur at the
country average ages for which developed countries have more observations. Actually, the
pattern for developed countries is quite flat, with small declines at the highest country average
ages.
The pattern for East Asia is much more pronounced and closer to the life-cycle
hypothesis prediction than is the pattern for LAC. The increase for East Asia is sharper than
average between ages 23 and 29. There is also a sharper (and significant) decline between ages
32 and 35. In contrast, the country average age pattern of domestic savings in LAC is flat
between ages 21 and 27, increases (although much less than in East Asia) between ages 27 and
30, and is flat thereafter. For LAC, only the country average age pattern between ages 24 and 27
is significantly different from the patterns for other regions.  For East Asia the portion between
ages 22 and 28 (where the sharp increase is observed) is significantly different from the rest, but
the pattern from age 29 on, is not.
If we consider the worldwide pattern as the generalized relation between age structure
and savings, the steeper pattern for East Asia suggests that the region took great advantage of the
early part of the demographic transition to boost savings while aging at the end of the transition
is associated with greater rates of disavings in the region.  In contrast, the early stage of the
demographic transition in LAC is associated with no increase in savings.  While the expansion of
savings between the mean ages of 27 and 30 is as steep as the world average, savings again
flattens out after the age of 30. One possibility is that right when the region was provided with
the demographic boost, it was hit by the negative shock of the debt crisis. The third of the
specifications we have estimated, with decade interactions (in this case together with LAC
dummy interactions in Table A4), is intended to address this possibility. These results suggest
that, after controlling for the country average age, LAC seems to have been savings less in the
1990s than in the 1960s, but the difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, the
slowdown in the country average age pattern should not be attributed to a shock in any specific
decade, but must be reflecting structural differences between this and other regions.
GDP per capita: When the country average age increases from low levels there is an initial shift
in the age structure of the population toward people in working ages. If the rate of employment14
generation were sufficiently large we would expect this process to be associated with an increase
in GDP per capita. One way of illustrating this point is by comparing the GDP per capita to the
GDP per worker for countries with different age structures. If there were no differences in
average worker productivity between two countries, their GDPs per capita would differ if one
had a larger share of its population in the working ages than did the other. In Figure 4 we
compare Hong Kong (one of the fastest growing economies with one of the oldest populations)
with Mexico (which has a relatively young population) and Argentina (which has one of the
oldest populations in LAC, but still a young population in comparison with developed countries).
The first panel in the figure plots GDP per capita for Mexico and Hong Kong. This panel
indicates that GDP per capita in Hong Kong has been greater than that in Mexico since 1960.
However, in Hong Kong a larger proportion of the population has been of working age.
Therefore if we plot the GDP per worker, the differences narrow considerably. Panel B still
indicates that Hong Kong has grown at a much faster pace, but it only seems to have surpassed
Mexico in terms of GDP per worker in about 1990. So, our ranking of these two countries for the
period 1960-1990 after “adjusting” for differences in population structure would be modified. A
similar story applies for the difference between Argentina and Hong Kong in Panels C and D.
Figure 5 plots the coefficient estimates for the country average age dummies from
estimating equation (1) with PPP adjusted GDP per capita as the dependent variable. When we
use the whole sample of countries we find that GDP per capita is quite flat and stable at young
ages, and starts increasing as the population ages (with statistically significant increases after age
27). When comparing the position of specific regions and countries on the horizontal axis, it
seems that East Asia (and, more so the four fast-growing East Asian economies) is already
benefiting from the demographic effect of reducing young dependency rates, while LAC on
average is still at the initial stages of this process and Africa on average has a population much
younger than that at which the upturn has occurred historically.
When the regressions are estimated separately for each region, we find that East Asia has
a much steeper slope with respect to age than does LAC, all developing countries as a group (the
pattern for all developing countries overlaps considerably with the LAC pattern and therefore is
not included in Figure 5) or all developed countries. In East Asia the demographic transition was
accompanied by a sharp and significant increase in GDP per capita, while for the other regions
GDP per capita does not seem to follow a distinguishable average-age pattern. The East Asian15
pattern is significantly different from the rest of the world up to age 31 and from ages 37 on.
The specification with decade-region interactions suggest that LAC experienced a severe
negative shock right at the moment when demographics might start “paying off,” with
significantly negative effects for the 1980s and 1990s.
Capital per worker: When a country has a relatively young population, the rate at which its
working age population is expanding tends to outpace the rate of capital accumulation.  But after
some point, when the size of the cohorts entering working ages declines, capital per worker tends
to increase. Thus, we would expect that capital per worker would follow a similar pattern as
GDP per capita, though with country-average-age associated increases commencing at higher
ages. Figure 6 presents the country average age pattern that emerges from estimating equation
(1) using capital per worker as the dependent variable.  As anticipated, the curve is flat at young
ages and has a strong positive slope at older ones, with statistically significant increases after age
31.
Regional differences are also apparent in Figure 6.  For East Asia, surprisingly there is a
negative (and significant) decline between ages 22 and 31, but after this age, there is an increase,
which is statistically significant between ages 30 and 33. The patterns for all developing
countries and for LAC are quite flat, and significantly less than the average pattern at the oldest
ages for LAC. Part of the reason why LAC has a flatter pattern at older ages is that the 1990s
decade was characterised by a negative effect on capital per worker for this region.  Developed
countries have a significant increase at older ages.  Therefore mainly East Asian and developed
countries determine the general pattern for this variable.
Tax revenue as a share of GDP: Figure 7 presents the coefficient estimates from regressing tax
revenue as a share of GDP
 on the country average age dummies and country and time fixed
effects. The pattern for the whole sample indicates that tax revenue as a proportion of GDP
declines somewhat with increasing average age of populations until the country average age
reaches about 31 years, but increases as the average age of the population increases from 31
years on. This reflects that in the transition from a young to an older population, the relative
weight of the potential tax base increases. We expect that at some point, with the increase in the
relative size of the population that is retired, there will be reductions in the rate of increase of the16
tax share as the average age of the population increases further. Eventually a turning-point in the
average-age pattern of tax revenues due to the increased old-age dependency rate will be
observed.  But apparently, once there is control for country and year fixed effects, the experience
for 1950-1995 does not lead to identifying this turning point.  All in all, the associations between
country average ages and tax revenue shares in GDP are not all that strong (certainly much
weaker than for savings shares). The only changes that are actually statistically significant are
those between ages 30 and 32 and between ages 34 and 39.
However, the shape of the country average age pattern for tax revenues as a share of GDP
differs markedly by region. The increase after age 30 that is observed in the general pattern
seems to be determined exclusively by developing countries, where the raise at the second half of
the age-spectrum is statistically significant, while the pattern for developed countries is quite flat.
The pattern for East Asia is significantly flatter than the general one.  The LAC pattern is similar
to the general one, but from age 27 is significantly different from those for other regions. For the
1980s and 1990s, moreover, LAC has significantly greater tax revenue as a share of GDP even
after controlling for the demographic effect of changing age structures and country and year
fixed effects.
3.2 Governmental Expenditures on Education and Health
Public expenditures on education as a share of GDP: We expect that countries with young
populations, where the proportion of children is large, face greater demand for educational
expenditures, which would be reflected in a larger share of these in GDP. Figure 8 presents the
age coefficient patterns for public expenditures on education as a share of GDP.
10 Perhaps
surprisingly, the average-age pattern for public expenditures on education is basically flat, with a
slight reduction as country average ages increase up to the early 30s and then a slight increase
(but practically none of the coefficient estimates differ significantly from each other).
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10 There also may be changes in demands for private services and substitution between public and private
educational and health services.  We have not been able to find data to explore such possibilities.
11 The curves in this figure (and in some others below) go below zero even though the underlying dependent
variables are nonnegative by definition.  This reflects the positive impact of country and/or year effects, which have
been purged in the estimates used to obtain these figures.  What is of primary interest for this paper is not whether
such estimates are positive but what are the slopes as the country average age changes.17
However, the relation seems to differ considerably by region. While the pattern from developed
countries and all developing countries taken together do not seem to be very different from the
general one, East Asia and LAC present stark contrasts. East Asia appears to have a pattern that
is not in line with the general one, but the differences are not statistically significant. In LAC,
public expenditures in education as a share of GDP falls significantly between ages 20 and 30
and increases between ages 30 and 33 (the pattern between ages 20 and 26 is significantly
different from other regions). The decline observed in LAC cannot be attributed to “decade”
effects; the interaction between the LAC region dummy and the decade dummies is insignificant
after controlling for average age effects and the LAC country average age dummy interaction
(see Appendix Table A4).
Public expenditure on primary education per primary school-age child as a proportion of GNP:
Figure 9 plots the coefficient estimates from estimating equation (1) for public expenditure on
primary education per primary school-age child as a proportion of GNP. This curve indicates that
as the country average age increases, public expenditure on primary education per school-age
child as a proportion of GNP increases -- with fairly large slopes both for country average ages
in the 20 to 25 year range and above 30 years that generally are statistically significant. This
pattern is consistent with the fact that if the share of education expenditures for primary
education in GDP remains constant as the country average age changes, as suggested by Figure
8, the expenditure per child is relatively small in countries with young populations but public
expenditures per primary-age child tend to increase as the relative size of this group falls with the
demographic transition.  If more public expenditures per primary-school-age child increase the
quality of basic public schooling (about which there is some controversy; see, e.g., Hanushek
1995 and Kremer 1995), then this pattern may have an important impact on productivity and
other outcomes for these children in their post-schooling years.
Figure 9 suggests that East Asia on average has benefited from the average-age related
increases in expenditure per school age child for some time already, though with considerable
potential for further benefits as the country average age approaches that of current developed
countries.  On average LAC is just entering the stage of the average-age profile where this
variable increases, with the overall Asian average slightly behind the LAC region.  Developed
countries as a group have been on the positive-sloping section of the curve for quite some time,18
while on the average African countries are still far away from being at the stage where constant
public expenditure GDP shares in education imply greater resources per school-age child.
For developing countries, the country average age pattern is steeper than the pattern
observed for the whole sample, while the pattern for developed countries is much flatter. This
may seem surprising because educational expenditures tend to be higher in developed countries.
However, the graph is not inconsistent with that possibility because it is showing that, after
controlling for country characteristics such as the preference to spend more on education in
general and year effects, there is no evidence that developed countries have spent more per
primary school age child as their populations have been aging.
It may be surprising that the pattern for East Asia in Figure 9 is flatter than the pattern for
developing countries, and does not show an increase after age 30. This suggests that if East
Asian countries spend on average more in education than countries in other developing country
regions, as the available evidence seems to indicate, they do so regardless of their age structure.
The LAC pattern is much more in line with the one for the whole sample (and is not significantly
different from the general pattern), indicating that expenditures in primary education per child
increase with country average age, although the increase starts at a later age than the world
average.
Health expenditures as a share of GDP: We expect that in very young and very old countries,
the demands for health services are larger than if most of the population is of working age.
Figure 10 presents the coefficient estimates from the base regression applied to health
expenditures as a share of GDP.
   As expected, the average-age profile for health expenditures is
“U” shaped. If countries have low average age (and high young dependency ratios), health
expenditures as a share of GDP tend to be high, reflecting the demand for public health services
that is typical of the initial stages of the demographic transition that are characterized by high
fertility and high infant mortality.
12 As the average age (and the population share of the working
age population) increases, the shares of health expenditures in GDP decline. They reach a
minimum at age 33 and then start rising for higher average ages, apparently in response to
                                                       
12 As shown by Savedoff and Piras (1999), data from LAC reveal that at young country average ages, the proportion
of deaths by communicable diseases (that tend to affect infants and small children more than older individuals) is
about 90%, but the proportion decreases to about 30% at older ages.  At the other end of the life cycle the proportion
of deaths due to circulatory diseases and external causes increases substantially at older country average ages.19
increased demand by older individuals, who are increasing their population share. The decline up
to age 33 is statistically significant, but the coefficient estimates for the country average age
dummy from this age on do not differ significantly from one another.
The average age in Africa is associated with a high share of health expenditure, while the
typical Asian and LAC countries are at the stage of the demographic transition where the aging
process is associated with declining health expenditures as a share of GDP. East Asia is close to
the turning point of the health expenditure-age relationship (with the four fast-growing East
Asian countries past it), while developed countries have an average age at which expenditures in
health tend to increase.
The pattern for all developing countries mirrors the general pattern, while developed
countries taken alone suggest a slight reduction in health expenditure shares as countries age.
The East Asian pattern is quite flat, but not significantly different from the average. In contrast,
LAC follows an inverted “U” pattern, with health expenditures increasing as countries age, and
then declining between ages 28 and 32 similarly to the whole.
3.3 Social Indicators
Gini coefficient of inequality: Figure 11 presents the estimated average-age pattern for inequality,
using the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable.
13 We obtain an upward sloping curve and
the increases observed after age 27 are statistically significant (the only coefficient estimates in
the right portion of the figure that are not consistently different from the rest are those for ages
28 and 29).  Prima facie the result may seem surprising because it is well known that the oldest
and most developed countries tend to have less unequal distributions than do the younger and
less developed ones, and developed countries are well represented at older ages. However, the
results in Figure 11 are not inconsistent with this well-known fact. The coefficient estimates of
the dummy variables are capturing the average-age profile of the Gini coefficient with controls
                                                       
13 Dummy variables indicating that the index comes from a household rather than an individual distribution and that
the welfare indicator is consumption rather than income also were introduced into the specification, but with no
significant implications for the coefficient estimates of the age dummy variables. The coefficient estimates for these
inequality data indicators (i.e., household versus individual, consumption versus income) are not presented in Table
A1 for brevity but are available upon request. The income distribution data was “cleaned” to assure that within the
same country the welfare indicator (income or expenditure) and the unit of observation (households or individuals)
remains unchanged.20
for country effects. The country effects control for characteristics such as the degree of
homogeneity and the general level of development over the sample period.
The estimates imply that abstracting from such differences among countries,  as a
population ages there is an age structure effect that generates pressures toward increasing
inequality. This evidence is in line with results from several studies using micro data that have
found that inequality within cohorts tends to increase with age in part because of the persistent
effects of good and bad shocks experienced early in the life cycle (e.g., good or bad luck in
initial job match, bad luck in experiencing chronic illnesses or disabilities).
14 The regression
results suggest that these effects  are reflected in the Gini inequality index for the whole
distribution of income. When the population weight of older (and more unequal) age groups
increases, inequality tends to rise. This does not imply that a country will necessarily become
more unequal as it ages, but simply that there are unequalizing age structure factors that will
predominate unless there are other stronger effects in the opposite direction.
On average, Africa, Asia and LAC are close to the lowest part of the curve for the whole
sample.  In contrast East Asia and even more the developed countries on average have larger
current unequalizing effects due to their age structures.  This is striking because LAC has been
the most unequal region in the world in recent decades. If inequality within cohorts continues to
increase with country average age in LAC, there will be intensified age-structure inequality-
increasing pressures in much of the region in the initial decades of the 21
st century. In fact,
according to Figure 11, the country average age pattern for the Gini coefficient is steeper in Latin
America than in any other region in the 27-31 age range, although the difference is only
statistically significant for the change observed by age 28. East Asia has the steepest pattern for
average ages 27 and under, a pattern that is significantly different from those for other regions.
The pattern for all developing countries mirrors the general pattern.  The pattern for the
developed countries does not deviate from the general pattern in contrast to what might have
been expected by some because of the relatively low inequality in the developed countries.
Unemployment rates: Changes in the age structure are also expected to have strong effects on
unemployment rates because different age groups usually have very different probabilities of
                                                       
14 See, for instance Attanasio and Székely (1998), Deaton (1997), Deaton and Paxson (1994), Duryea and Székely
(1998)  and Lam (1997).21
becoming unemployed. Unemployment rates tend to be higher among younger workers because
when individuals enter the labor market for the first time they spend more time searching for the
best match for their skills, they are less costly to release, they tend to have less information about
labor markets, and they and potential employers tend to have less knowledge about their own
comparative advantages and preferences than do older workers.
15  Thus, we would expect that
when the working age population of a country is relatively young, unemployment rates will tend
to be higher, but unemployment will be lessened as the age structure shifts toward older ages.
Figure 12 presents estimates that are consistent with these expectations. Unemployment rates are
relatively high and even increasing when the country average age is very young, and decline
continuously between the ages of 22 and 33.
  For ages higher than 33, unemployment rates start
increasing again. One interpretation of the increase at older country average ages is that there
may be increasing difficulty in finding employment at older ages due to the specificity of human
capital and experience. The increase between ages 20 and 21 and the decline between ages 26
and 33 both are statistically significant, as is the difference between the coefficient estimate for
age 31 and the coefficient estimates for most higher country average ages.
Figure 12 also allows comparisons across regions in the horizontal axis. Africa, Asia and
LAC are on average in the downward sloping section of the average-age pattern, implying that as
the country average age increases there may be further declines in unemployment rates ceteris
paribus. East Asia, in contrast, already is near the lowest point of the average-age- related
unemployment pattern and the developed countries are on the upward-sloping segment.
The unemployment rate is the only variable considered so far for which the general
pattern is very similar to the patterns observed in the smaller samples of developing, developed,
Latin American and Caribbean and East Asian countries. In all of these regions there is a
declining trend at relatively younger ages, and an increase at older ages. In statistical terms, the
LAC pattern is different from the rest of the regions only for ages 25 to 28 and for age 32 and
there do not seem to be any decade effects for this region. The East Asian pattern is only
significantly different at some of the youngest ages and at age 36.
                                                       
15 Duryea and Székely (1998) discuss these arguments and explore some of their implications for several LAC
countries. Another argument, developed in Pages and Montenegro (1999) is that severance payments that increase
with tenure provide dis-incentives to hire young workers and create incentives for their displacement if there are
negative shocks.22
Homicide rates: There is evidence that crime rates tend to be higher among juveniles
16 so we
would expect that with a surge in the relative importance of the crime-prone age groups total
crime rates would raise and that they would tend to fall as the population shifts to older ages.
17
As noted by Morrison, Pages and Fuentes (1999), information on crime rates is usually plagued
by problems of under-reporting, but generally homicide rates tend to be subject to less
measurement error than other crime indicators. Thus, Figure 13 uses homicide rates.
  The form of
the curve for the whole sample supports the argument that there is an inverted “U” relation
between homicide rates and age structure with a peak at country average age of 26, although
there is a slight increase at the oldest ages. However, the only cases where the coefficient
estimates are statistically significantly different from each other are in the increase observed
between ages 22-24 and age 28, close to where the peak is observed. So, there is evidence of a
positive relationship between shifts of population from young to juvenile, and increases in
homicide rates, but the expected reduction from shifts to older ages is not statistically significant.
On average LAC and Asia are close to the country average age at which homicide rates
peak, while Africa is on the verge of entering the age range with the positive relation between
age structure shifts from young to juvenile ages and homicide rates. East Asia is on the
downward slope of the general curve, where age structure shifts are expected to result in
reductions in homicides.
The pattern observed in developing countries mirrors the general pattern for the whole
sample, while in developed countries there seems to be a reduction at older ages rather than a
slight increase. In LAC,  the country average age pattern of homicide rates is significantly
different at ages 24 to 28, where rather than registering a turning point, homicide rates increase.
In fact, from age 26 on, homicide rates remain much more stable. There is also is a significant
and negative decade effect in the 1990s in LAC. For East Asia the pattern also differs from the
one that emerges for the whole sample. In the case of this region, homicide rates increase
consistently with country average age, and the differences from the overall pattern are
statistically significant
                                                       
16 Some of the best evidence comes from the United States. See Levitt (1998).
17 Easterlin (1978, 1987) argues that this effect is reinforced in the case of individuals born in relatively large
cohorts. Morrison, Pages and Fuentes (1999) present some empirical evidence for LAC that supports this argument.
Levitt (1998) argues that the demographic effect is observed but not very large in the United States.23
Schooling progression: Figure 14 plots the country average age coefficient estimates for
schooling progression -- the probability that a student belonging to the cohort that is of school
age in the year of reference, progresses to grade 4.
  We choose this variable because we would
like to capture the crowding out effect that would be expected to occur when large proportions of
a population demand a service. The probability of progression to grade 4 is low at young country
average ages, and then increases as country average age increases, with relatively steep slopes
for the country average age ranges of 23-27 and 31-35. The difference between the coefficient
estimates for ages 20 to 34 and those for ages 36-39 are significant in most cases. This pattern is
consistent with the crowding out argument, and is also consistent with the results in Figure 9 that
suggests that public education expenditures per child (which presumably have an effect on the
quality of education) are initially low, and start increasing when a country ages.
It would appear that on average the LAC region has already benefited from this positive
effect for the 23-27 age range, though with potential in the future for the gains from the 31-35
age range. East Asia on the average is poised to benefit from the gains for the 31-35 age range.
The four fast-growing East Asian economies on the average apparently already have benefited
from most of the latter age range
The nature of the relationship seems to be different in LAC than in other regions. While
the pattern for developing countries, East Asia and developed countries is in line with the general
pattern, the relation between country average age and the probability of progressing to grade 4 in
LAC is much flatter (although the differences are only statistically significant in few cases). The
reason why LAC diverges from the other regions does not seem to be that the region was subject
to a shock in a specific decade. In fact, the decade effects for the 1990s and 1980s are
significantly higher than those observed in the 1960s, even after controlling for country and year
fixed effects and country average age. This suggests that on average, the region has not been able
to benefit from the demographic opportunity to improve its education prospects.
4. Age Patterns and Policy Variables
The evidence presented so far indicates that a number of key variables for the
development process have clear average-age-related patterns. LAC is entering the stage where
some of the strongest (mostly positive) age structure effects will start to be perceived, while East24
Asia has already for a while been at a stage in which their population age structures have
provided favorable conditions for development. Africa has much younger populations, which
means that most of these potential gains are further in the future.
We also find that for some regions the average-age pattern significantly differs from the
general pattern. One reason might be that some regions have been more able to translate the
demographic opportunity into better economic performance by implementing specific
complementary policies. Consider, for instance, Figures 5 that shows that clearly East Asia has
followed a country average age pattern for GDP per capita that is very different from the LAC
experience, even after controlling for country specific effects and year effects.
This leads to the question of which are the policies associated with more desirable age
patterns. If in fact, demography provides a boost for GDP per capita, as Figure 5 suggests, why
have the LAC and East Asian experiences been so different? In this section we try to shed light
on this question by including some policy variables in the analysis. We explore whether the
demographic opportunities for increasing GDP per capita, increasing savings and improving
education attainment are associated with trade policy, financial market development,
macroeconomic stability and governmental expenditures on education.
Our econometric strategy is similar to the one used in the previous section to identify age
patterns by region; we divide the sample in different ways to check whether an age pattern is
different among subsamples. We re-estimate equation (1) for GDP per capita, unemployment
rates, domestic savings as a share of GDP and the probability of progressing to grade 4,
respectively; but rather than using the whole sample as we did to derive the general patterns in
Section 3, we subdivide the sample depending on whether the value of the policy indicator of
interest for country ‘i’ at time ‘t’ is below or above the median for that variable. In addition we
run a regression for the full sample in which we include interactions between a dummy variable
that indicates whether or not each observation is associated with a value above or below the
relevant policy indicator mean and the country average age dummies (Appendix Table A5). This
last regression permits testing whether there are statistically significant differences between
coefficient estimates of the country average age variables if the policy indicator is above versus
below the median.
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18 Two additional regressions were estimated to check for the robustness of the patterns in all the figures presented
below. First we estimate equation (1) by including the observations where the value of the policy variable of interest
is above the median, and also include the policy variable of interest as control. Second we regress the dependent25
The four policy variables on which we focus are: (i) exports plus imports over GDP as a
proxy for trade openness
19; (ii) the value of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP as a
measure of financial market development; (iii) the absolute value of the coefficient of variation
of the GDP per capita growth rate for ‘t’, ‘t-1’, ‘t-2’, and ‘t-3’ as a proxy for macroeconomic
volatility; and (iv) in the case of the probability of progressing to grade 4, the proportion of
governmental expenditures on education relative to GDP.
   Table 4 presents some summary
statistics for these variables, all of which have substantial variation in the sample.  Because, as in
Section 3, in all our regressions here we continue to include country and year fixed effects, again
all of the age patterns that we report are net of country specific characteristics and year effects.
Domestic savings rates: One of the most emphasized aspects of changing age structures, as noted
above, is the change in savings that occurs under the life-cycle savings models.  The extent to
which the tendencies to change savings patterns as age structure changes, however, may depend
importantly on aspects of the economy that are related to major policy choices, several of which
we now investigate.
Domestic savings as a proportion of GDP and trade openness: In the full sample there is
evidence of a somewhat inverted “U” pattern between country average age and domestic savings
(Figure 3). Figure 15a plots the coefficient estimates for the average country age for the two
subsamples defined by being above or below the median trade openness. The interaction terms in
the lower part of Table A5 indicate that the average age pattern of domestic savings is
statistically significantly different for countries with trade openness above the median than for
those with openness below the median.  The coefficient estimates for the average age pattern of
domestic savings for the countries with openness above the median is very similar to the overall
                                                                                                                                                                                  
variable on the age dummies and country and time effects for the cases where the value of the policy variable of
interest is below the median, and also include the policy variable of interest as a control. We only present below the
cases where the country average age patterns that result from the regression are not modified by the inclusion of this
control.
19 One drawback of this particular indicator of trade openness is that small economies may be inherently more open
than large ones due to scale economies, and that countries with certain mixes of factor endowments also tend to
trade more. Spilimbergo, Londoño and Székely (1999) construct a measure of trade openness that controls for
country size (in terms of both, geographic size and GDP), geographic location in terms of distance to the major
world markets, and factor endowments. We use this measure of trade openness as an alternative to exports plus
imports over GDP in the regressions described below, but in all cases, the coefficients of interest were insignificant
in statistical terms. Therefore, the conclusions derived from the use of the proxy for trade openness described in the
text should be taken with caution, since they are not robust to other indicators of openness.26
general pattern in Figure 3. It increases fairly sharply with country average age until age 33, and
then declines somewhat thereafter. In contrast, the estimates for the subsample for which trade
openness is below the median have a much flatter pattern with a peak at a country average age of
31. This difference suggests that in the countries that are relatively more open to trade, the shift
in age structure toward older ages is more likely to be translated into higher saving.
Domestic savings as a proportion of GDP and financial market development: The extent to
which age structure changes due to the demographic transition can provide an opportunity for
savings also a priori depends on the development of financial markets.  If individuals are credit
constrained and are subject to uncertainty, savings will be of much higher frequency and
individuals will be less able to save with long-term objectives such as accumulating assets for
retirement and will find it more difficult to shift between current and future consumption.
20
Figure 15b explores if in fact the country average age pattern of domestic savings differs at
higher or lower levels of financial market development. The average difference in the age
patterns for the subsamples below and above the median is statistically significant. Figure 15b
shows that the age pattern for observations above the median is similar to the general pattern for
the overall sample in Figure 3, while the pattern for observations below the median deviates
substantially after age 28, with a sharp decline in domestic savings after this age rather than a
further increase and a leveling off at older ages. This result is consistent with the idea that if
financial markets are more developed, individuals have more opportunities to save, and the
financial system is more efficient in allocating credit. Therefore, it is more plausible that
individuals are able to behave as the life-cycle theory predicts.
Domestic savings as a proportion of GDP and macro economic volatility: The methodology
employed for Figure 15a and 15b was also applied to the relation between domestic savings and
macroeconomic volatility. But the difference between the two age patterns of coefficient
estimates is not statistically significant so we do not present a figure for this case.
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20 Deaton (1991) discusses this argument in detail.
21 The results are available upon request.27
GDP per capita: Although the demographic transition from a young to an older population
initially can boost the prospects for economic growth due to the reduction in the young-
dependency ratio, the shift to larger proportions of the population in working ages can also
constitute a potential threat if the right policies are not in place.  Figure 5 suggests that in East
Asia this shift was accompanied by substantial increases in GDP per capita, but this would have
not been the case if the population moving to working age did not have employment
opportunities. We here consider types of policies that a priori would be expected to affect the
likelihood of translating the demographic shift into an opportunity rather than a burden.
GDP per capita and trade openness: If a country is open to trade and the size of the working age
population is increasing quickly, it would seem to be more able to exploit the comparative
advantage of having more labor. However when we split the sample according to levels of
exports plus imports as a share of GDP above and below the median, we find no significant
differences so we do not present a figure for this case.
GDP per capita and financial market development: Better financial markets improve the
allocation of financial resources, which would be expected to be associated with more
employment generation. Figure 16a plots the coefficient estimates from estimating relation (1)
for subsamples for which the level of private credit as a share of GDP are above and below the
median, respectively.  The differences are statistically significant. For the cases where financial
markets are relatively more developed, the country average age pattern of GDP has a positive
slope from age 27 on, and is much steeper. For those with relatively low financial development,
the country average age pattern is practically flat. This suggests that financial markets may play
an important role in assuring that the expansion of the working age population is translated into
greater economic activity.
GDP per capita and macroeconomic volatility: We expect that countries that are subject to lower
macroeconomic volatility would benefit from lower uncertainty. A more stable environment
during the period of expansion of the working age population will make it more likely to attract
investment, which is needed to create enough jobs for the new entrants into the labor market.
Figure 16b plots the coefficient estimates that result from estimating relation (1) with GDP per28
capita as the dependent variable for the two subsamples in which, respectively, our measure of
macro volatility is above and below the median. Although the curves do not seem to differ
markedly at very young and old ages, for several cases between ages 25 and 34 the observations
with relatively low volatility present significantly sharper increases in GDP per capita than the
cases below the median. This provides some support for the argument that a more stable
macroeconomic environment provides more favorable conditions in which to take advantage of
the demographic opportunity presented by the enlarged working-age population.
Unemployment rates: For reasons similar to those articulated above for savings rates and GDP
per capita, a priori it would seem that the coefficient estimates for the country average age
patterns in unemployment rates also might be associated with policy alternatives.
Unemployment rates and trade openness: Figure 17 plots the coefficient estimates for the
unemployment rates when we divide the sample into cases for which our proxy for trade
openness is above and below the median, respectively.  The hump-shape in the country average
age pattern for unemployment rates observed in Figure 12 is present in the cases of low trade
openness, but absent in those of relatively high openness. In fact, consistent with the results
discussed in Section 3, unemployment rates appear to be relatively high at young ages and
relatively low at older ones, but the decline in unemployment along the country average age
profile is much steeper in the cases where openness is above the median. This suggests that in
fact, trade policy might help to release some pressure from the labor markets at the time when
large shares of the population are entering working-age even if such effects are not reflected in
GDP per capita.
Unemployment rates and (a) financial market development and (b) macroeconomic volatility:
While a priori arguments are easy to make about why financial market development and
macroeconomic volatility both may be related to the estimated coefficients for the country
average age patterns, in fact we find no significant differences so we do not present these figures.
Probability of progressing to grade 4: Finally, we estimate four sets of regressions using the
probability of progressing to grade 4 as the dependent variable.  As subsample classification29
criteria, we use the three indicators that we examined for the other dependent variables in this
section -- trade openness, financial market development, and macroeconomic volatility -- and the
proportion of governmental expenditures on education as a share of GDP. A priori there are
arguments that each of these policy-related indicators might affect schooling success both
through changing the expected rates of return from investing in schooling and through changing
the costs of schooling directly and through the opportunity costs of time spend in school.  But we
do not find evidence of significant differences in the age patterns of estimates for subsamples
defined by any of these four policy-related indicators. We find this a surprising result (or
nonresult). Perhaps schooling is affected through other channels such as changing the quality of
education, but – if so – micro estimates suggest that even in this case there should be induced
changes in the quantity of schooling as well (e.g., Birdsall 1985).
5.  Conclusions
The economic literature has varied considerably over time regarding the importance that
it has given to demographic factors in the process of economic development.  At times those who
perceive that Mathusian factors severely limit human options have considered population growth
a major determinant of economic options, perhaps the major determinant.  At other times,
including in most of the mainstream economic literature of the last half century, demographic
considerations have been treated as but one of many factors that might shape aggregate options
in part because they respond to, as well as affect, the development process.  A number of studies
of empirical associations between population characteristics and economic aggregates in the
1950s through the early 1990s revealed very little that supported those that thought that
demographic factors played major conditioning roles in the development process.
In the 1990s, however, there has been a rebirth of emphasis on the importance that
demographic factors may play in conditioning economic development.  This emphasis has not
been on traditional Mathusian population pressures, but instead on how the shifting age structure
during the demographic transition may offer medium-term economic opportunities. This recent
aggregate evidence, perhaps supported by very recent micro analysis of life cycle savings, raises
again the question of whether there is an inverse relation between population growth and per
capita income growth, particularly through transitory effects on the age structure of population30
(which, although transitory, may last for decades). Thus, there has been a recent shift from
emphasis on the negative long-run effects of population growth on economic outcomes to focus
on medium-run effects of changes in the age structure on economic outcomes, with increasing
emphasis on the opportunities that transitory reductions in dependency ratios may afford.  The
empirical explorations related to such possibilities to date, however, have been limited and have
not considered many of the channels through which these effects might be manifested.
This paper presents new evidence on the association between the average age of a
population and three groups of economic outcomes: (1) macroeconomic aggregates (domestic
savings as a share of GDP, GDP per capita, capital per worker and tax revenue as a share of
GDP); (2) governmental expenditures in education and health; and (3) social indicators
(inequality, unemployment, homicide rates, and schooling progression rates). This evidence is
based on analysis of panel data for 164 countries for 1950-1995. The results suggest that the
variables considered follow clear age-related patterns, that the patterns differ by regions, and that
the patterns differ with different policy regimes related to trade openness, domestic financial
market deepening and macroeconomic volatility. The evidence is consistent with the possibility
that some age structure shifts can provide favorable conditions for development. Apparently
regions such as East Asia in recent decades have been able to benefit from this demographic
opportunity. However, in others such as LAC and South Asia (which are at the verge of
experiencing the largest age structure shifts in the coming decades) and with further lag, Africa --
creating an adequate economic environment to translate the opportunity into higher living
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Average Age Pattern of Domestic Saving
for High and Low Levels of Openness





















































































Average Age Pattern of Domestic Saving
 for High and Low Private Credit/GDP
Private credit  above the
median


































































































Average Age Pattern of GDP per capita
 for High and Low Private Credit
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Average Age Pattern of GDP per capita
 for High and Low Volatility
Volatility  above the median





















































































Average Age Pattern of Unemployment
 Rates for High and Low Openness
Openness  above the median
Openness below  the median41
Table 1
Demographic Structure of the Population
Average Age Old dependency    Young dep.    (%) of Pop.    (%) of Pop.    (%) of Pop.
of Population          Ratio          Ratio   65 and over 15-64 Age grp. 0-14 Age grp. Region
2020 1995 2020 1995 2020 1995 2020 1995 2020 1995 2020 1995
32.6 28.3 0.14 0.10 0.38 0.50 0.09 0.07 0.66 0.62 0.25 0.31 World total
Africa
28.2 24.7 0.09 0.07 0.49 0.66 0.06 0.04 0.63 0.58 0.31 0.38 Southern Africa
28.9 23.4 0.07 0.06 0.41 0.68 0.05 0.03 0.67 0.57 0.28 0.39 Western Sahara
23.6 21.4 0.06 0.05 0.69 0.89 0.03 0.03 0.57 0.51 0.39 0.46 Western Africa
23.1 21.0 0.05 0.05 0.70 0.90 0.03 0.03 0.57 0.51 0.40 0.46 Eastern Africa
22.7 21.5 0.06 0.06 0.75 0.91 0.03 0.03 0.55 0.51 0.41 0.46 Middle Africa
29.8 24.2 0.09 0.07 0.41 0.67 0.06 0.04 0.67 0.58 0.27 0.39 Northern Africa
26.03 22.70 0.07 0.06 0.57 0.79 0.04 0.03 0.61 0.54 0.34 0.42 Average Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
31.0 24.4 0.11 0.07 0.40 0.63 0.07 0.04 0.66 0.59 0.26 0.37 Central America
32.8 27.0 0.13 0.08 0.36 0.53 0.09 0.05 0.67 0.62 0.24 0.33 South America
31.91 25.70 0.12 0.08 0.38 0.58 0.08 0.05 0.67 0.61 0.25 0.35 Average LAC
Asia
30.4 25.2 0.10 0.07 0.40 0.63 0.06 0.04 0.67 0.59 0.27 0.37 South-central Asia
31.8 25.7 0.10 0.07 0.35 0.56 0.07 0.04 0.69 0.61 0.24 0.34 South-eastern Asia
29.0 25.1 0.10 0.08 0.48 0.63 0.06 0.04 0.63 0.59 0.30 0.37 Western Asia
37.3 30.5 0.17 0.10 0.28 0.37 0.12 0.07 0.69 0.68 0.19 0.25 Eastern Asia
32.11 26.61 0.12 0.08 0.38 0.55 0.08 0.05 0.67 0.62 0.25 0.33 Average Asia
Europe and North America
39.0 35.2 0.26 0.19 0.30 0.34 0.16 0.12 0.64 0.66 0.19 0.22 Northern America
40.9 37.7 0.30 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.63 0.65 0.18 0.19 Northern Europe
43.0 38.3 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.65 0.67 0.15 0.18 Western Europe
43.7 37.8 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.66 0.68 0.14 0.17 Southern Europe
40.3 35.8 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.68 0.67 0.16 0.21 Eastern Europe
41.38 36.97 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.65 0.67 0.16 0.19 Average Europe and NA




Average All Middle East 4 East Eastern Western
Age regions Industrial LDC's Africa LAC Asia East Asia Asian European Europe
19 20 20 11 7
20 236 236 106 28 8 50
21 1,080 1,080 595 165 60 164 47
22 1,580 1,580 645 187 223 216 33 5 32
23 1,555 1,555 413 283 270 208 44 28 100
24 1,139 1,139 210 229 211 129 34 15 83
25 655 3 655 89 160 90 64 59 27 60
26 393 14 390 26 84 33 27 36 9 91
27 292 8 278 23 50 24 34 19 7 75 10
28 236 43 228 32 42 15 35 18 7 56 5
29 239 66 196 12 33 6 15 19 11 75 26
31 263 123 197 52 23 10 16 10 82 34
32 383 127 260 42 9 7 15 10 124 67
33 352 78 225 29 6 12 10 5 123 93
34 254 122 176 19 5 8 6 3 104 52
35 303 137 181 7 4 1 6 3 122 94
36 336 182 199 3 1 118 118
37 296 102 114 3 82 177
38 163 88 61 3 32 99
39 107 34 19 3 4 85
          Summary statistics for average age by region
Region Mean Standard Max Min
Deviation
All regions 25.2 6.57 19 40
Industrial 34.0 2.84 26 40
LDC's 24.1 6.06 19 38
Africa 22.3 1.62 19 29
LAC 24.4 3.06 20 34
Asia 23.8 2.42 20 35
Middle East 23.3 2.61 19 34
East Asia 23.2 9.45 0 39
4 East Asian 26.5 3.31 22 35
Eastern Europe 30.0 4.29 22 38
Western Europe 34.5 2.71 27 40
Source: Authors' calculations.43
Table 4
                            Summary statistics for policy-related variables
variable Median Median Mean Standard Max Min
Deviation
Exports+Imports/GDP 53.3 62.3 42.11 423.4 4.67
Private Credit/GDP 22.9 32.1 28.44 209.068 0.08681
Volatility 1.3 6.0 69.60 659.152 0.01134
Exp. in Education/GDP 12.5 14.8 9.80 71.8132 0.54539





38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 Variable
26.1 24.5 27.1 27.5 26.5 30.1 28.2 27.9 26.1 25.2 23.6 14.4 16.9 12.5 10.6 6.3 8.5 7.9 3.3 Dom. Saving (%GDP)
6.32 6.14 6.90 7.09 6.97 8.02 7.59 7.61 7.22 7.12 6.75 4.15 5.00 3.78 3.25 1.93 2.66 2.50 1.05
11374 10069 8080 6967 5946 5469 4347 3560 2575 904 281 -422 -961 -849 -998 -1194 -1150 -1185 -1346 GDP per capita
26.08 23.42 19.04 16.52 14.21 13.15 10.57 8.68 6.27 2.21 0.69 -1.05 -2.43 -2.18 -2.58 -3.10 -3.00 -3.13 -3.63
23458 18249 13253 11457 6030 5346 2451 1362 -948 166 -1055 -976 -1237 -566 -19 -27 605 785 192 Cap. per Wker
13.35 10.71 8.00 7.04 3.77 3.41 1.60 0.89 -0.63 0.12 -0.78 -0.72 -0.98 -0.47 -0.02 -0.02 0.54 0.73 0.19
5.69 5.73 4.16 3.42 2.45 1.29 -0.07 0.60 -0.48 2.04 1.81 2.65 3.09 3.00 3.39 2.74 3.17 4.59 3.55 Tax Rev. (%GDP)
2.97 3.09 2.30 1.92 1.38 0.74 -0.04 0.36 -0.30 1.28 1.17 1.73 2.12 2.12 2.44 1.99 2.36 3.54 2.70
-1.19 -0.46 -1.10 -1.02 -0.81 -1.28 -1.25 -1.11 -1.79 -1.12 -1.20 -0.65 -0.60 -0.63 -0.47 -0.21 -0.13 0.29 Exp. Educ. (%GDP)
-0.89 -0.36 -0.87 -0.84 -0.69 -1.14 -1.13 -1.13 -1.97 -1.37 -1.56 -0.88 -0.87 -0.97 -0.74 -0.35 -0.24 0.80
14.29 14.41 10.68 9.57 6.87 7.38 7.17 6.75 1.39 1.06 0.33 0.94 -0.22 0.50 -0.04 -0.66 -2.41 -3.86 -4.67 Exp. p/child prim.
3.30 3.44 2.62 2.38 1.74 1.91 1.89 1.86 0.42 0.33 0.11 0.32 -0.08 0.18 -0.02 -0.26 -0.97 -1.63 -2.01
-3.55 -3.25 -3.83 -4.48 -4.53 -4.59 -5.47 -4.01 -3.99 -2.83 -2.40 -1.62 -1.55 -1.14 -1.12 -0.22 -0.32 Health Exp. (%GDP)
-2.09 -1.96 -2.36 -2.88 -3.05 -3.19 -4.17 -3.24 -3.59 -2.90 -2.71 -2.00 -2.12 -1.74 -1.89 -0.45 -1.15
0.66 -0.56 -2.55 -1.65 -1.56 -2.72 -3.44 -4.29 -4.32 -2.69 -4.70 -7.85 -7.31 -7.51 -8.00 -8.34 -8.56 -8.14 -5.55 Gini  coefficient
0.43 -0.37 -1.62 -1.01 -0.91 -1.53 -1.86 -2.24 -2.11 -1.25 -1.94 -3.30 -2.94 -2.99 -3.00 -3.03 -3.00 -2.64 -1.53
0.28 0.40 -0.60 -0.75 -0.81 -0.91 -2.47 -0.65 0.23 0.55 1.40 2.77 3.64 5.68 6.14 6.22 6.35 7.23 4.40 Unemployment Rate
0.11 0.16 -0.24 -0.29 -0.31 -0.35 -0.93 -0.24 0.08 0.19 0.48 0.95 1.22 1.87 1.97 1.94 1.90 2.08 1.25
10.30 10.03 9.36 8.31 8.22 9.45 9.70 10.19 9.21 10.05 12.29 12.64 11.00 9.01 4.97 6.18 7.07 2.37 Homicides per 1000
1.12 1.14 1.11 1.03 1.04 1.25 1.34 1.48 1.42 1.64 2.09 2.22 2.07 1.80 1.03 1.37 1.63 0.79
13.87 12.41 13.15 13.94 13.71 12.84 11.03 9.14 8.56 9.39 8.24 8.50 9.48 6.53 3.06 0.03 -0.53 2.17 1.12 Progression to Grade 4
2.80 2.62 2.79 2.97 2.97 2.86 2.51 2.20 2.16 2.45 2.29 2.38 2.72 1.93 0.92 0.01 -0.17 0.72 0.37
Source: Authors' calculations. 't' Statistics presented in italics below the coefficients.45
Table A2
Estimation of  Average Age Patterns for Aggregate Variables with Regional Interactions
(Coefficients for Interaction of Latin American Dummy with Avg. Age Dummy)
Constant Year Interacted Age Dummies Dependent
Trend 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 Variable
216.0 -0.1 -0.9 1.3 1.4 3.6 -3.9 -10.9 -4.8 -14.5 -13.3 -10.5 -7.0 -7.2 -9.4 8.2 Dom. Saving (%GDP)
6.39 -6.12 -0.22 0.32 0.33 0.72 -0.76 -2.01 -0.86 -2.56 -2.37 -1.86 -1.24 -1.26 -1.61 1.27
-101383 53 285 1920 2860 3433 4731 4201 4063 4663 3063 2807 3378 3891 4436 5209 GDP per capita
-34.19 35.58 0.58 3.90 6.23 6.11 7.99 6.93 6.67 7.20 4.79 4.42 5.29 6.03 6.76 7.31
-469583 243 5235 -3985 -4193 -3441 -3369 -1643 -1516 -3350 -3987 -2515 Cap. per Wker
-21.15 21.26 2.07 -1.15 -1.64 -1.40 -1.60 -0.81 -0.79 -1.84 -2.33 -1.63
-160.47 0.09 16.03 10.87 12.17 7.54 7.63 -5.83 -5.32 1.66 2.78 2.14 1.96 3.96 2.83 1.74 Tax Rev. (%GDP)
-5.60 6.13 3.70 2.56 3.09 2.18 2.34 -2.20 -2.20 0.72 1.44 1.18 1.13 2.36 1.83 1.36
-56.11 0.03 0.62 1.07 -0.29 -0.89 0.89 0.59 2.57 2.51 2.84 3.57 4.33 5.21 7.24 Pub. Exp. Educ. (%GDP)
-2.58 2.74 0.74 0.86 -0.21 -0.50 0.83 0.53 2.22 2.10 2.32 2.82 3.11 3.34 4.03
76.33 -0.03 0.60 0.01 4.97 1.36 -1.73 -1.42 -0.04 1.90 -1.42 -4.78 -5.77 -4.09 -2.13 -0.59 Pub. Exp. p/child prim.
1.42 -1.13 0.06 0.00 0.62 0.18 -0.25 -0.23 -0.01 0.38 -0.34 -1.24 -1.57 -1.17 -0.65 -0.23
-107.25 0.06 0.35 5.01 0.96 1.29 0.80 1.12 0.62 0.41 -2.25 Pub. Health Exp. (%GDP)
-2.79 2.88 0.33 2.78 0.50 0.79 0.59 0.97 0.65 0.52 -2.51
126.52 -0.04 2.56 9.92 6.74 8.68 -1.55 1.98 1.48 -0.63 -0.71 -2.17 Gini  coefficient
3.06 -2.10 0.41 1.39 1.07 2.02 -0.37 0.51 0.38 -0.16 -0.17 -0.46
-251.15 0.13 6.13 8.05 5.82 6.65 4.15 6.88 8.33 8.35 6.71 3.93 3.82 3.55 6.40 5.80 Unemployment Rate
-4.17 4.41 1.37 1.92 1.42 1.65 1.05 1.83 2.23 2.72 2.21 1.34 1.34 1.26 2.41 2.47
180.39 -0.09 7.57 5.25 -3.04 -1.73 22.45 41.01 21.58 27.87 14.34 10.40 7.63 -0.44 Homicides per 1000
1.17 -1.17 0.88 0.80 -0.49 -0.26 2.28 4.60 2.52 3.46 1.88 1.35 1.03 -0.06
85.82 -1.19 -33.79 26.09 -0.89 3.13 6.08 0.99 -8.56 -13.23 -27.75 Progression to Grade 4
24.78 -0.34 -4.25 2.71 -0.12 0.40 0.77 0.13 -1.06 -1.45 -2.94
























Estimation of  Average Age Patterns for Aggregate Variables with Regional Interactions
(Coefficients for Interaction of East Asian Dummy with Avg. Age Dummy)
Interacted Age Dummies Dependent
39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 Variable
1.8 3.8 6.2 1.8 1.2 -1.9 4.7 3.3 2.3 -2.1 -10.8 -3.2 -16.8 -21.5 -24.8 -35.6 -30.7 Dom. Saving (%GDP)
0.18 0.54 0.89 0.26 0.20 -0.31 0.81 0.58 0.40 -0.36 -1.75 -0.49 -2.62 -3.47 -3.85 -5.53 -4.68
-2246 -2270 -1923 -667 685 -418 -2 -1183 -3066 -2959 -3919 -3831 -4263 -5971 -7088 -7210 -6656 GDP per capita
-2.37 -2.74 -2.33 -0.81 0.96 -0.58 -0.00 -1.82 -4.67 -4.49 -5.80 -5.65 -6.10 -8.73 -9.96 -10.23 -9.33
-3272 -2336 -2337 -3501 -398 -6267 -5094 -7765 -5226 -211 1044 -753 -1255 -3845 -6339 -4385 Cap. per Wker
-0.94 -0.82 -0.82 -1.17 -0.14 -2.48 -2.04 -3.15 -2.09 -0.09 0.48 -0.44 -0.76 -2.27 -3.50 -2.48
10.46 8.29 7.34 7.61 8.96 8.78 11.12 11.05 10.62 0.05 2.05 2.55 2.24 0.50 -1.33 -1.68 Tax Rev. (%GDP)
2.61 2.18 1.94 1.90 2.37 2.32 3.26 3.68 3.69 0.02 0.84 1.05 0.97 0.22 -0.60 -0.74
-2.45 -1.35 0.73 -0.71 -0.64 -1.41 -0.74 -1.02 -1.04 Pub. Exp. Educ. (%GDP)
-2.08 -1.03 0.52 -0.51 -0.38 -0.87 -0.43 -0.60 -0.55
-0.57 3.09 3.05 4.81 -0.29 10.75 8.88 10.00 9.19 6.96 3.18 1.24 2.78 Pub. Exp. p/child prim.
-0.15 0.73 0.78 1.22 -0.06 1.92 1.69 2.13 2.14 1.98 0.96 0.39 0.80
-0.46 -1.18 -0.17 -2.50 2.27 0.22 -0.14 -0.27 Pub. Health Exp. (%GDP)
-0.58 -1.36 -0.28 -2.95 1.73 0.26 -0.15 -0.29
-4.99 -4.47 -6.08 -5.17 -5.46 -2.78 -3.69 -3.06 -6.37 -6.01 -2.66 -7.68 -10.53 -13.89 Gini  coefficient
-0.87 -0.73 -1.04 -0.90 -0.95 -0.48 -0.64 -0.53 -1.64 -1.39 -0.65 -1.83 -2.48 -3.02
-5.79 -6.76 -6.33 -3.73 -2.91 -2.56 -1.45 1.46 1.45 1.08 3.90 4.90 3.75 4.12 0.56 0.76 Unemployment Rate
-1.51 -1.87 -1.77 -1.05 -0.83 -0.77 -0.44 0.45 0.47 0.37 1.40 1.80 2.04 2.23 0.33 0.46
-26.35 -24.47 -21.46 -19.07 -21.00 -22.35 -21.57 -21.28 -21.34 -23.02 -27 -21 -15.56 -16.66 Homicides per 1000
-2.36 -2.24 -1.99 -1.77 -2.13 -2.41 -2.35 -2.41 -2.72 -3.18 -3.60 -3.13 -2.40 -2.05
1.61 0.81 0.33 1.56 3.73 -3.46 -2.13 -3.35 -6.85 -8.62 -6.75 -1.99 Progression to Grade 4
0.34 0.17 0.07 0.31 0.79 -0.63 -0.40 -0.63 -1.27 -1.51 -1.18 -0.33
Source: Authors' calculations. 't' Statistics presented in italics below the coefficients.47
Table  A4
Estimation of  Average Age Patterns for Aggregate Variables 
             with Regional and Decade Interactions
(Coefficients for Interaction of Latin American Dummy-Decade Dummy)
F Test R-square T-bar No. No. Constant Year Decade Interaction Dependent
Within Countries Obs. Trend 1990 1980 1970 1960 Variable
50.19 0.10 5.70 164 934 213.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 1.8 Dom. Saving (%GDP)
5.88 -5.84 -0.39 0.03 2.16
200.19 0.68 8.10 139 1,123 -108876 56 -1265 -342 142 -2 GDP per capita
-31.90 32.59 -8.44 -2.94 1.34 -0.02
209.24 0.75 5.90 63 374 -486816 251 -2015 -229 473 Cap. per Wker
-19.50 19.63 -2.94 -0.49 1.26
72.76 0.16 3.80 134 503 -153.58 0.09 0.97 1.16 Tax Rev. (%GDP)
-5.19 5.68 1.39 2.70
17.46 0.12 2.40 141 338 -66.08 0.04 -1.41 -0.94 Pub. Exp. Educ. (%GDP)
-2.99 3.18 -1.69 -1.20
39.07 0.09 3.20 126 405 93.79 -0.04 0.21 1.21 Pub. Exp. p/child prim.
1.67 -1.42 0.17 1.74
Pub. Health Exp. (%GDP)
26.69 0.11 2.40 52 126 149.27 -0.05 0.68 1.44 1.64 3.45 Gini  coefficient
3.37 -2.51 0.30 0.73 0.84 1.61
34.73 0.25 3.00 75 226 -355.66 0.18 1.31 2.94 1.94 Unemployment Rate
-5.96 6.14 0.66 1.59 1.09
11.19 0.40 3.30 115 374 -4.22 0.00 -5.66 -2.76 Homicides per 1000
-0.03 0.04 -1.86 -1.43
36.47 0.18 2.10 123 264 83.37 11.13 5.68 Progression to Grade 4
24.93 6.57 5.84
Source: Authors' calculations. 't' Statistics presented in italics below the coefficients.48
Table  A5
Estimation of Average Age Patterns for Aggregate Variables
With Interactions Between Age Patterns and Policy Dummies
Dependent Variable: PPP Adjusted      Dependent       Dependent Variable: Domestic
                GDP per capita       Variable:                  Saving/GDP Average
Unemployment
                    Policy Variabes  Policy Variabe              Policy Variabes
Volatility of GDP     Private Credit Trade Openness Private Credit Trade Openness Age 
                 Growth
t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. Coeff. Dummy
0.24 258 0.02 25 0.74 7.1 -0.40 -3.6 -3.16 -21.5    a20
0.39 405 0.11 153 -0.39 -3.5 -3.18 -19.4    a21
0.62 652 0.15 208 1.91 16.3 -0.29 -2.6 -3.32 -19.8    a22
0.41 432 0.23 316 1.76 14.5 -0.50 -4.6 -3.66 -21.8    a23
0.53 569 0.60 827 1.93 15.8 -0.45 -4.2 -3.15 -18.8    a24
0.59 645 0.60 848 1.99 15.6 -0.08 -0.8 -2.82 -16.5    a25
0.67 740 0.46 696 2.04 15.7 0.08 0.8 -1.94 -13.6    a26
1.23 1,403 0.60 939 1.68 13.0 0.08 0.8 -1.67 -13.6    a27
1.91 2,194 0.87 1,322 1.46 11.5 0.85 8.6    a28
2.19 2,516 1.70 2,720 0.96 4.5 0.37 4.0 -0.08 -0.7    a29
3.63 4,162 2.80 4,272 1.07 4.8 -0.49 -5.2 0.13 1.0    a30
4.91 5,654 2.56 4,029 1.02 4.3 0.45 5.2 0.40 3.0    a31
5.71 6,571 3.82 6,022 0.70 3.3 0.37 4.0 -0.27 -2.1    a32
6.10 7,196 3.69 6,144 1.12 5.1 0.57 7.7 0.25 1.9    a33
6.82 7,989 2.59 5,269 1.03 4.7 -0.03 -0.6 0.50 3.9    a34
7.76 9,195 5.91 9,535 1.17 5.1 0.93 10.8 0.03 0.2    a35
8.58 10,108 5.54 9,164 1.04 4.8 0.57 6.2 0.08 0.6    a36
10.50 12,643 4.84 9,624 0.81 3.6 0.13 1.5 0.09 0.7    a37
11.88 15,183 5.02 10,212 1.37 6.6 -0.18 -2.5 -0.09 -0.9    a38
8.99 12,221    a39
11.45 41 11.51 42 2.40 0.2 -2.49 -0.1 -2.57 -0.1   year
1.99 2,046 -0.17 (300) 1.41 5.1 -1.68 -19.7 -2.56 -23.4 Policy Variable
Age-Policy Interactions
-1.88 (2,124) 0.21 374 0.86 10.4 2.44 24.0 age20*policy
-1.97 (2,076) 0.29 498 1.57 11.0 1.36 16.0 2.61 24.4 age21*policy
-2.16 (2,267) 0.31 537 -1.02 -4.5 1.51 17.8 2.96 27.6 age22*policy
-1.97 (2,069) 0.12 213 -1.07 -4.2 1.44 17.0 2.86 26.7 age23*policy
-1.71 (1,806) -0.08 (132) -1.62 -6.7 1.83 21.7 2.70 25.3 age24*policy
-1.60 (1,742) 0.06 112 -1.39 -5.8 1.56 18.7 2.60 24.5 age25*policy
-2.15 (2,480) -0.01 (19) -2.21 -9.3 1.66 20.8 2.40 24.6 age26*policy
-1.69 (1,961) 0.37 712 -1.25 -5.6 1.63 21.1 2.20 24.6 age27*policy
-2.67 (3,164) 0.28 526 -1.07 -5.6 1.63 20.6 2.36 18.2 age28*policy
-1.24 (1,453) 0.11 213 2.13 27.8 2.00 22.5 age29*policy
-1.72 (1,936) 0.03 56 2.83 36.3 1.42 16.0 age30*policy
-2.74 (3,052) 0.73 1,368 1.95 26.5 1.80 19.3 age31*policy
-3.04 (3,396) 0.09 167 -0.73 -2.2 2.25 28.6 2.49 26.6 age32*policy
-1.68 (1,951) 0.65 1,277 -1.19 -3.7 1.64 24.7 2.32 24.1 age33*policy
-2.48 (2,807) 1.15 2,614 -1.27 -4.5 1.68 29.9 1.62 16.4 age34*policy
-2.46 (2,753) -0.40 (755) -1.16 -4.7 1.49 19.5 2.41 24.2 age35*policy
-1.44 (1,626) 0.59 1,132 -1.27 -5.5 1.85 23.5 2.15 22.1 age36*policy
-2.61 (3,112) 1.25 2,749 -0.40 -1.6 2.05 26.7 1.80 19.0 age37*policy
-3.57 (4,268) 1.60 3,629 -0.63 -2.8 2.10 32.3 1.97 23.1 age38*policy
8.55 13,309 2.66 30.3 2.27 23.8 age39*policy
-11.2 (79,788) -11 (82,159) -2.37 -381.6 2.76 178.3 3.01 207.8 Constant
1,123 1,123 226 934 934 No. Obs.
139 139 75 164 164 Countries
8.08 8.08 3.01 5.70 5.70 T-bar 
0.65 0.64 0.34 0.11 0.08 R-sq within   
42.96 41.34 1.70 2.14 1.67 F( 40,   730) 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 Prob > F 
Source: Author's calculations49
Appendix B
Table B1: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
               Dependent variable: Domestic Saving




0.000 0.040 0.014 23
0.000 0.006 0.002 0.000 24
0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 25
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 26
0.050 0.121 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 27
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 28
0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 29
0.508 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 30
0.245 0.073 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 31
0.783 0.188 0.055 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
0.148 0.104 0.014 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 33
0.005 0.198 0.334 0.846 0.454 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 34
0.458 0.075 0.612 0.800 0.470 0.217 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35
0.791 0.638 0.064 0.508 0.676 0.601 0.316 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
0.020 0.022 0.206 0.001 0.032 0.064 0.420 0.730 0.670 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37
0.309 0.486 0.399 0.836 0.040 0.281 0.389 0.981 0.697 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 38
0.969 0.637 0.800 0.735 0.949 0.305 0.596 0.669 0.982 0.796 0.511 0.003 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 39
Table B2: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                           Dependent variable: PPP-Adjusted GDP per capita




0.507 0.918 0.266 23
0.006 0.056 0.051 0.013 24
0.082 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 25
0.350 0.748 0.051 0.129 0.093 0.021 26
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 27
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 28
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 29
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 30
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 31
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 33
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 34
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 38
0.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 39
Table B3: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                                Dependent variable: Capital Per Worker




0.082 0.080 0.721 23
0.983 0.141 0.115 0.742 24
0.175 0.263 0.026 0.024 0.281 25
0.179 0.013 0.034 0.002 0.002 0.062 26
0.714 0.548 0.171 0.205 0.043 0.034 0.196 27
0.922 0.800 0.478 0.149 0.178 0.038 0.030 0.175 28
0.089 0.207 0.088 0.361 0.826 0.828 0.636 0.523 0.980 29
0.122 0.900 0.977 0.753 0.673 0.326 0.353 0.132 0.105 0.308 30
0.000 0.098 0.005 0.019 0.005 0.035 0.151 0.170 0.472 0.596 0.303 31
0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.015 0.084 0.132 0.049 32
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 33
0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 34
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 38
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3950
Table B4: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
       Dependent variable: Tax Revenue as Share of GDP
38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 Age dummy
20
  0.0428 21
  0.0008   0.5672 22
  0.2541   0.0004   0.2620 23
  0.0856   0.6336   0.0387   0.8378 24
  0.3076   0.5656   0.7517   0.0140   0.5029 25
  0.8556   0.5507   0.5409   0.8989   0.0424   0.6067 26
  0.5172   0.6019   0.2854   0.9089   0.5211   0.0292   0.3769 27
  0.2621   0.0677   0.0893   0.0289   0.2379   0.1035   0.0022   0.0924 28
  0.7666   0.4738   0.1882   0.2283   0.1011   0.4320   0.2265   0.0108   0.1751 29
  0.0029   0.0134   0.0014   0.0001   0.0002   0.0000   0.0014   0.0005   0.0000   0.0008 30
  0.1354   0.1274   0.2323   0.0511   0.0132   0.0167   0.0067   0.0499   0.0228   0.0007   0.0204 31
  0.2959   0.6139   0.0405   0.0860   0.0163   0.0038   0.0049   0.0020   0.0168   0.0075   0.0002   0.0070 32
  0.0114   0.3054   0.0346   0.4771   0.6432   0.2399   0.1086   0.1280   0.0692   0.2344   0.1339   0.0110   0.1020 33
  0.0292   0.0000   0.0111   0.0010   0.7081   0.5815   0.8657   0.5816   0.6362   0.4346   0.8198   0.5802   0.1132   0.4417 34
  0.0903   0.0003   0.0000   0.0003   0.0000   0.2198   0.1761   0.5298   0.7822   0.7278   0.9802   0.5999   0.8527   0.4005   0.9316 35
  0.1518   0.0065   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0694   0.0566   0.2340   0.3896   0.3548   0.5513   0.2929   0.4783   0.7661   0.6838 36
  0.0006   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0021   0.0020   0.0183   0.0399   0.0353   0.0809   0.0333   0.0773   0.4401   0.1606 37
  0.9426   0.0050   0.0003   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0040   0.0037   0.0266   0.0551   0.0496   0.1046   0.0468   0.0992   0.4782   0.1883 38
  0.0009   0.0009   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0003   0.0002   0.0008   0.0003   0.0010   0.0137   0.0033 39
Table B5: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
               Dependent variable: Public Expenditure in Education as % of GDP




0.788 0.282 0.726 23
0.274 0.35 0.138 0.459 24
0.478 0.117 0.197 0.084 0.332 25
0.89 0.663 0.249 0.293 0.125 0.387 26
0.874 0.962 0.64 0.294 0.312 0.139 0.381 27
0.116 0.085 0.133 0.087 0.031 0.052 0.025 0.118 28
0.842 0.233 0.225 0.28 0.192 0.086 0.106 0.05 0.17 29
0.141 0.294 0.033 0.038 0.049 0.037 0.016 0.023 0.011 0.049 30
0.132 0.984 0.887 0.456 0.438 0.481 0.372 0.227 0.227 0.119 0.259 31
0.782 0.386 0.857 0.951 0.44 0.423 0.457 0.367 0.243 0.238 0.133 0.257 32
0.929 0.74 0.423 0.826 0.92 0.425 0.411 0.444 0.36 0.24 0.236 0.134 0.254 33
0.121 0.283 0.607 0.159 0.693 0.65 0.849 0.811 0.844 0.716 0.533 0.506 0.317 0.49 34
0.477 0.495 0.621 0.891 0.299 0.907 0.844 0.673 0.646 0.68 0.574 0.422 0.405 0.252 0.401 35
0.832 0.497 0.691 0.773 0.985 0.38 0.978 0.912 0.633 0.61 0.642 0.545 0.404 0.388 0.245 0.385 36
0.015 0.084 0.405 0.077 0.14 0.35 0.098 0.459 0.442 0.844 0.89 0.866 0.997 0.813 0.769 0.535 0.718 37
0.014 0.784 0.683 0.446 0.876 0.93 0.91 0.491 0.937 0.995 0.59 0.571 0.602 0.517 0.392 0.378 0.245 0.375 38
0.897 0.324 0.978 0.898 0.694 0.837 0.875 0.995 0.521 0.996 0.942 0.694 0.672 0.698 0.614 0.489 0.469 0.324 0.454 39
Table B6: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
          Dependent variable: Public Expenditure in primary education per child




0.016 0.001 0.001 23
0.354 0.009 0.000 0.000 24
0.467 0.197 0.008 0.000 0.000 25
0.446 0.860 0.693 0.090 0.012 0.007 26
0.306 0.729 0.449 0.260 0.032 0.004 0.002 27
0.629 0.671 0.901 0.797 0.528 0.108 0.022 0.012 28
0.582 0.941 0.410 0.736 0.517 0.343 0.074 0.017 0.009 29
0.833 0.508 0.806 0.371 0.638 0.459 0.315 0.078 0.020 0.011 30
0.001 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 31
0.735 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
0.813 0.617 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 33
0.558 0.773 0.933 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 34
0.003 0.031 0.038 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 35
0.141 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37
0.913 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 38
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3951
Table B7: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                Dependent variable: Public expenditures in Health as % of GDP




0.815 0.652 0.652 23
0.004 0.122 0.059 0.059 24
0.923 0.024 0.159 0.081 0.081 25
0.161 0.270 0.010 0.065 0.034 0.034 26
0.834 0.274 0.329 0.023 0.083 0.046 0.046 27
0.012 0.059 0.021 0.037 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.007 28
0.242 0.013 0.030 0.011 0.019 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003 29
0.022 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 30
0.970 0.099 0.047 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 31
0.000 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
0.096 0.391 0.468 0.071 0.038 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 33
0.811 0.112 0.477 0.538 0.096 0.052 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 34
0.885 0.802 0.159 0.572 0.613 0.133 0.076 0.020 0.022 0.012 0.015 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004 35
0.095 0.194 0.210 0.045 0.849 0.880 0.395 0.253 0.091 0.093 0.057 0.063 0.017 0.027 0.018 0.018 36
0.003 0.005 0.029 0.040 0.009 0.435 0.499 0.725 0.506 0.223 0.221 0.144 0.152 0.050 0.071 0.050 0.050 37
0.201 0.352 0.066 0.124 0.139 0.033 0.649 0.696 0.564 0.385 0.162 0.163 0.105 0.113 0.036 0.052 0.037 0.037 38
0.679 0.715 0.352 0.082 0.124 0.135 0.034 0.575 0.623 0.661 0.468 0.215 0.214 0.143 0.151 0.054 0.073 0.053 0.053 39
Table B8: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                                Dependent variable: Gini Coefficient




0.775 0.881 0.228 23
0.570 0.483 0.911 0.291 24
0.457 0.300 0.289 0.664 0.415 25
0.817 0.434 0.297 0.275 0.596 0.478 26
0.586 0.728 0.887 0.666 0.578 0.861 0.365 27
0.005 0.043 0.025 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.066 0.749 28
0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.300 29
0.137 0.795 0.007 0.040 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.064 0.662 30
0.971 0.135 0.782 0.009 0.045 0.033 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.070 0.659 31
0.210 0.348 0.489 0.404 0.001 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.030 0.465 32
0.267 0.033 0.096 0.976 0.200 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.015 0.337 33
0.066 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.334 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.185 34
0.894 0.137 0.022 0.003 0.016 0.403 0.065 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.202 35
0.115 0.188 0.831 0.319 0.082 0.142 0.915 0.215 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.023 0.336 36
0.001 0.097 0.225 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.138 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.120 37
0.187 0.000 0.023 0.055 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.047 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.064 38
0.670 0.714 0.106 0.314 0.365 0.127 0.063 0.025 0.035 0.210 0.053 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.127 39
Table B9: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                                  Dependent variable: Unemployment rate




0.833 0.276 0.178 23
0.868 0.765 0.275 0.206 24
0.250 0.327 0.405 0.159 0.373 25
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.608 26
0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.289 27
0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 28
0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 29
0.605 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 30
0.171 0.067 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 31
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
0.005 0.681 0.143 0.076 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 33
0.833 0.007 0.832 0.232 0.139 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 34
0.913 0.784 0.013 0.908 0.308 0.202 0.060 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 35
0.784 0.735 0.645 0.017 0.948 0.428 0.298 0.103 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 36
0.062 0.057 0.078 0.087 0.001 0.287 0.874 0.906 0.454 0.087 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.089 37
0.825 0.195 0.162 0.182 0.184 0.005 0.402 0.966 0.838 0.438 0.096 0.034 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.092 38
0.330 0.260 0.953 0.927 0.889 0.824 0.144 0.999 0.546 0.431 0.212 0.043 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.051 3952
Table B10: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
                                  Dependent variable: Homicide Rates




0.660 0.247 0.172 23
0.511 0.398 0.479 0.306 24
0.013 0.160 0.475 0.083 0.073 25
0.294 0.003 0.056 0.218 0.041 0.040 26
0.477 0.135 0.004 0.038 0.134 0.027 0.027 27
0.904 0.636 0.238 0.015 0.071 0.189 0.041 0.037 28
0.479 0.355 0.744 0.735 0.125 0.298 0.491 0.135 0.103 29
0.785 0.405 0.312 0.601 0.956 0.263 0.471 0.654 0.216 0.156 30
0.731 0.966 0.602 0.511 0.832 0.770 0.223 0.394 0.555 0.191 0.141 31
0.851 0.874 0.927 0.551 0.470 0.756 0.875 0.313 0.491 0.643 0.248 0.181 32
0.908 0.786 0.943 0.881 0.536 0.464 0.730 0.927 0.374 0.550 0.694 0.289 0.213 33
0.580 0.577 0.527 0.793 0.676 0.411 0.351 0.570 0.876 0.551 0.729 0.859 0.407 0.300 34
0.967 0.623 0.590 0.557 0.816 0.697 0.430 0.372 0.593 0.893 0.552 0.725 0.852 0.411 0.305 35
0.545 0.662 0.974 0.907 0.816 0.971 0.886 0.584 0.526 0.760 0.950 0.463 0.620 0.744 0.356 0.267 36
0.690 0.402 0.530 0.846 0.920 0.968 0.857 0.997 0.690 0.636 0.865 0.865 0.427 0.572 0.690 0.336 0.254 37
0.887 0.656 0.414 0.519 0.800 0.870 0.978 0.826 0.962 0.740 0.690 0.908 0.841 0.433 0.570 0.681 0.344 0.263 38
0.987 0.909 0.738 0.529 0.583 0.823 0.881 0.974 0.837 0.960 0.764 0.718 0.920 0.847 0.461 0.591 0.695 0.367 0.283 39
Table B11: F Tests for significance of differences between coefficients 
              Dependent variable: % of school age cohort progressing to grade 4




0.199 0.018 0.069 23
0.204 0.966 0.201 0.311 24
0.300 0.057 0.398 0.670 0.738 25
0.274 0.060 0.014 0.122 0.697 0.719 26
0.104 0.486 0.982 0.503 0.966 0.391 0.457 27
0.822 0.083 0.377 0.853 0.643 0.894 0.317 0.381 28
0.912 0.782 0.153 0.436 0.804 0.790 0.841 0.357 0.405 29
0.324 0.269 0.196 0.023 0.094 0.241 0.505 0.297 0.095 0.123 30
0.705 0.205 0.172 0.118 0.018 0.068 0.166 0.352 0.208 0.069 0.089 31
0.812 0.613 0.204 0.177 0.130 0.026 0.080 0.172 0.331 0.208 0.078 0.095 32
0.399 0.523 0.426 0.131 0.114 0.082 0.017 0.052 0.116 0.232 0.145 0.053 0.067 33
0.680 0.304 0.424 0.355 0.110 0.097 0.071 0.015 0.046 0.100 0.198 0.126 0.047 0.058 34
0.885 0.633 0.308 0.401 0.337 0.108 0.096 0.071 0.016 0.047 0.099 0.191 0.123 0.047 0.058 35
0.008 0.066 0.035 0.010 0.062 0.072 0.015 0.013 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.016 0.041 0.024 0.007 0.010 36
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.001 37
0.882 0.042 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.002 38
0.649 0.605 0.210 0.056 0.060 0.046 0.029 0.038 0.035 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.023 0.016 0.007 0.008 3953
Appendix C
Average Age Country Average Age Country
2025 1995 1950 2025 1995 1950
32.86 24.93 25.22 Ecuador 51 25.15 22.81 20.61 Afghanistan 1
32.19 24.89 23.64 Egypt 52 25.65 22.13 22.70 Africa 2
31.58 23.98 22.24 El Salvador 53 35.12 27.71 25.92 Albania 3
24.88 23.21 27.35 Equatorial Guinea 54 31.36 23.41 24.27 Algeria 4
25.64 22.10 21.73 Eritrea 55 22.87 20.91 23.11 Angola 5
42.55 36.52 33.01 Estonia 56 35.11 30.83 27.79 Argentina 6
22.79 21.30 21.98 Ethiopia 57 37.74 30.28 28.22 Armenia 7
42.56 37.06 31.71 Europe 58 34.12 27.45 25.44 Asia 8
33.47 25.74 20.64 Fiji 59 39.26 34.87 31.84 Australia 9
41.78 37.70 29.72 Finland 60 43.92 37.78 35.08 Austria 10
42.87 37.43 34.82 France 61 35.09 27.71 28.24 Azerbaijan 11
33.21 25.87 21.58 French Polynesia 62 36.48 27.94 24.28 Bahamas, The 12
26.15 26.21 29.43 Gabon 63 36.35 26.63 22.17 Bahrain 13
26.37 23.27 24.25 Gambia, The 64 30.89 23.19 25.16 Bangladesh 14
38.28 34.21 31.79 Georgia 65 39.43 33.12 27.64 Barbados 15
44.48 39.25 34.71 Germany 66 41.28 35.69 31.19 Belarus 16
25.75 21.78 21.39 Ghana 67 42.78 38.46 35.47 Belgium 17
44.60 38.76 29.37 Greece 68 30.85 22.24 24.32 Belize 18
37.22 30.79 24.59 Guadeloupe 69 24.08 20.64 28.77 Benin 19
34.70 27.52 22.44 Guam 70 25.22 22.83 23.86 Bhutan 20
26.87 21.98 21.57 Guatemala 71 28.87 23.54 23.35 Bolivia 21
23.04 20.79 22.39 Guinea 72 42.34 33.30 24.46 Bosnia and Herzegovina 22
24.83 23.79 24.86 Guinea-Bissau 73 26.86 21.42 21.61 Botswana 23
34.61 25.88 23.72 Guyana 74 34.80 27.00 22.96 Brazil 24
25.50 23.67 26.31 Haiti 75 35.42 25.43 25.37 Brunei 25
28.98 21.85 21.30 Honduras 76 42.22 37.79 29.99 Bulgaria 26
44.98 34.42 24.81 Hong Kong 77 22.68 20.68 22.23 Burkina Faso 27
41.75 37.44 31.89 Hungary 78 24.73 21.02 23.23 Burundi 28
38.82 33.57 29.35 Iceland 79 28.64 23.14 22.55 Cambodia 29
33.12 26.12 24.07 India 80 24.84 22.28 24.01 Cameroon 30
33.54 26.18 24.14 Indonesia 81 41.46 35.57 29.98 Canada 31
28.55 22.18 25.35 Iran, I.R. of 82 29.91 22.37 25.66 Cape Verde 32
27.26 22.24 21.28 Iraq 83 34.28 28.51 25.14 Caribbean 33
39.94 33.32 32.02 Ireland 84 25.70 23.25 26.10 Central African Republic 34
35.91 30.53 26.99 Israel 85 24.73 22.68 25.15 Chad 35
47.26 39.38 31.58 Italy 86 35.72 29.10 25.73 Chile 36
34.89 27.11 25.34 Jamaica 87 37.71 29.65 26.89 China 37
45.47 38.83 26.14 Japan 88 33.55 25.73 22.88 Colombia 38
26.48 21.45 22.94 Jordan 89 25.13 20.67 22.65 Comoros 39
35.23 29.34 27.96 Kazakstan 90 23.49 21.56 23.78 Congo 40
27.40 20.73 24.17 Kenya 91 32.76 25.94 22.65 Costa Rica 41
39.59 30.67 23.36 Korea 92 26.72 21.71 21.99 Cote d'Ivoire 42
36.41 28.32 23.38 Korea, North 93 41.37 37.22 31.00 Croatia 43
34.32 23.43 23.31 Kuwait 94 41.73 32.65 26.49 Cuba 44
32.16 25.82 30.24 Kyrgyz Republic 95 38.14 33.46 27.20 Cyprus 45
41.40 36.81 33.41 Latvia 96 42.08 36.32 33.03 Czech Republic 46
33.25 26.06 27.63 Lebanon 97 41.01 38.24 32.70 Denmark 47
26.27 23.30 24.23 Lesotho 98 26.68 22.98 20.63 Djibouti 48
24.11 22.91 23.08 Liberia 99 33.75 25.23 22.10 Dominican Republic 49
24.88 21.59 23.77 Libya 100 29.87 22.87 23.29 East Timor 50
Source: Authors'calculations from UN (1998)54
 Appendix C
Average Age Country Average Age Country
2025 1995 1950 2025 1995 1950
41.17 31.75 22.99 Singapore 151 40.81 35.52 31.59 Lithuania 101
40.13 33.84 29.89 Slovak Republic 152 41.20 37.74 35.01 Luxembourg 102
43.95 36.99 30.66 Slovenia 153 40.91 30.73 26.67 Macau 103
26.45 21.53 22.44 Solomon Islands 154 38.43 32.29 27.28 Macedonia 104
22.61 20.67 23.14 Somalia 155 24.29 20.84 22.79 Madagascar 105
29.79 25.06 24.52 South Africa 156 23.17 20.85 21.50 Malawi 106
45.61 37.70 30.42 Spain 157 32.61 24.83 24.23 Malaysia 107
35.78 28.55 23.47 Sri Lanka 158 23.19 20.56 21.74 Mali 108
28.00 22.91 22.35 Sudan 159 39.44 34.80 27.39 Malta 109
33.54 25.50 24.96 Suriname 160 38.06 32.46 25.48 Martinique 110
27.56 21.53 22.11 Swaziland 161 26.14 22.35 22.90 Mauritania 111
41.54 38.93 34.50 Sweden 162 35.71 28.89 21.66 Mauritius 112
44.17 38.17 33.85 Switzerland 163 28.78 23.64 23.53 Melanesia 113
29.25 21.29 23.77 Syrian Arab Republic 164 33.74 24.93 24.01 Mexico 114
Taiwan 165 36.89 32.19 30.03 Moldova 115
30.12 23.21 26.59 Tajikistan 166 31.32 23.53 23.19 Mongolia 116
24.54 20.97 20.94 Tanzania 167 32.83 24.58 21.84 Morocco 117
37.41 28.03 22.35 Thailand 168 23.95 22.00 22.84 Mozambique 118
23.87 21.58 23.80 Togo 169 31.81 25.25 24.57 Myanmar 119
36.02 28.45 24.27 Trinidad & Tobago 170 25.93 23.02 23.64 Namibia 120
33.42 25.46 25.17 Tunisia 171 27.16 22.79 24.55 Nepal 121
34.77 27.14 24.28 Turkey 172 43.54 37.01 30.36 Netherlands 122
31.20 23.88 27.82 Turkmenistan 173 37.91 31.76 26.40 Netherlands Antilles 123
22.00 19.89 21.70 Uganda 174 34.98 27.68 28.57 New Caledonia 124
41.81 36.99 30.79 Ukraine 175 38.04 33.91 31.18 New Zealand 125
36.78 28.12 23.09 United Arab Emirates 176 29.14 21.63 21.41 Nicaragua 126
41.50 37.97 34.86 United Kingdom 177 22.38 20.28 21.71 Niger 127
39.37 35.21 31.60 United States 178 24.61 21.51 21.13 Nigeria 128
36.41 33.96 30.69 Uruguay 179 40.57 37.52 33.54 Norway 129
31.12 23.95 28.55 Uzbekistan 180 36.15 32.04 30.03 Oceania 130
27.46 22.55 20.83 Vanuatu 181 22.53 21.14 22.65 Oman 131
32.75 25.11 21.91 Venezuela 182 27.92 22.37 25.43 Pakistan 132
32.85 24.81 26.24 Viet Nam 183 34.73 26.58 24.33 Panama 133
21.21 18.83 23.07 West Bank and Gaza 184 28.16 23.28 23.98 Papua New Guinea 134
22.90 19.99 23.24 Yemen, Republic of 185 28.58 23.05 26.12 Paraguay 135
39.34 35.27 29.65 Yugoslavia 186 32.99 25.20 23.44 Peru 136
22.87 20.91 22.55 Zaire 187 31.36 23.96 22.73 Philippines 137
23.95 19.91 21.47 Zambia 188 39.47 34.37 28.63 Poland 138
26.90 21.30 22.08 Zimbabwe 189 32.51 25.04 21.19 Polynesia 139
42.94 37.50 29.41 Portugal 140
36.55 29.53 23.25 Qatar 142
41.49 35.37 29.14 Romania 144
41.42 35.74 28.97 Russian Federation 145
24.83 20.51 21.02 Rwanda 146
31.56 23.91 20.45 Samoa 147
25.21 21.75 23.15 Senegal 149
23.94 22.12 23.91 Sierra Leone 150
Source: Authors'calculations from UN (1998)55
Appendix Table D: Data Sources
Variables Source
all age structure variables United Nations (1998)
domestic savings as a share of GNP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
PPP adjusted GDP per capita For 1950-1992, Penn World Tables. The World Bank
Development Indicators (1998) provide a series of PPP
adjusted GDP per capita for the period 1980-1997. We
use the growth rates from the World Bank (using the
same definition as in the Penn World Tables) to extend
the Penn World Tables series through 1995.
capital per worker Penn World Tables
tax revenue as a share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
public expenditures on education as a share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
public expenditure on primary education per primary
school-age child as a proportion of GNP
World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
health expenditures as a share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
Gini coefficients “good quality”  distribution data from Deininger and
Squire (1996)
Unemployment rates ILO (1998)
homicide rates Fajnzylber,  Lederman and  Loayza (1998), who
combine homicide rates from the United Nations
Surveys of Criminal Trends and Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems, and data from the World Health
Organization.
Probability that a student belonging to the cohort that is
of school age in the year of reference, progresses to
grade 4
World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
trade openness ((imports plus exports))/GDP Penn World Tables.
private credit as a share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)
macro volatility constructed from the Penn World tables and World
Bank data
expenditures in education as a share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (1998)56
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